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THE (UNNOTICED) REVITALIZATION OF
THE DOCTRINE OF EQUIVALENTS
DARYL LIM†
INTRODUCTION
Over the past century, few patent issues have been
considered so often by the Supreme Court of the United States as
the doctrine of equivalents (“DOE”).1 This judge-made rule deals
with a question that lies at the heart of patent policy—what is
the best way to define property rights in an invention? The
doctrine gives patentees an opportunity to ensnare an accused
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1
See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co. (Festo II), 535 U.S.
722, 733 (2002) (“[E]quivalents remain a firmly entrenched part of the settled rights
protected by the patent.”), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 988 (2004), and aff’d, 493 F.3d 1368
(Fed. Cir. 2007); Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 40
(1997) (“[W]e adhere to the doctrine of equivalents.”); Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v.
Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608 (1950) (citation omitted) (“Originating
almost a century ago in the case of Winans v. Denmead, [the doctrine of equivalents]
has been consistently applied by this Court and the lower federal courts, and
continues today ready and available for utilization when the proper circumstances
for its application arise.”); Lee Petherbridge, On the Decline of the Doctrine of
Equivalents, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 1371, 1372 (2010) (“No doctrine invested in the
Federal Circuit has produced more angst, controversy, or expense than the doctrine
of equivalents.”). Only cases on patent eligibility have probably been considered
more often. See Alice Corp. Pty. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 220–24 (2014)
(summarizing precedent).
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device that does not literally infringe a patent claim if the
accused device is substantially similar to each claim limitation.2
Patentees enjoy this advantage, but it comes at a cost to the
public, who must face the uncertainty of whether claims actually
mean what they say. This tension chafed the Justices and split
the Court almost down the middle in two early cases.3 From
those controversial beginnings to the present day, judges,
practitioners, and academics continue to debate the doctrine’s
proper scope and continued vitality.4
In 2007, Professors Allison and Lemley declared in the
Stanford Law Review that the doctrine, while once important,
Subsequent articles
was dead based on their case data.5

2

See Festo II, 535 U.S. at 727 (employing the doctrine to protect patentees from
those seeking “to evade liability for infringement by making only insubstantial
changes to a patented invention”); Wi-Lan, Inc. v. Apple, Inc., 811 F.3d 455, 463
(Fed. Cir. 2016) (“Infringement under the doctrine of equivalents requires the
patentee to prove that the accused device contains an equivalent for each limitation
not literally satisfied.”).
3
See Winans v. Denmead, 56 U.S. 330, 344 (1853); Graver Tank & Mfg. Co., 339
U.S. at 608.
4
See, e.g., Michael J. Meurer & Craig Allen Nard, Invention, Refinement and
Patent Claim Scope: A New Perspective on the Doctrine of Equivalents, 93 GEO. L.J.
1947, 1948 (2005) (“Perhaps no doctrine in patent law is as controversial as the
Doctrine of Equivalents . . . .”); Doug Lichtman, Substitutes for the Doctrine of
Equivalents: A Response to Meurer and Nard, 93 GEO. L.J. 2013, 2013–2014 (2005);
see also John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, The (Unnoticed) Demise of the Doctrine
of Equivalents, 59 STAN. L. REV. 955, 956–957 (2007) (noting that “[t]wo of the three
most important Supreme Court patent cases decided between 1981 and 2005
concerned the scope of a limitation on the doctrine of equivalents . . . [with one]
attracting more amicus briefs than any other Supreme Court patent case up to that
date.”). For significant scholarship on the doctrine of equivalents, see generally:
John F. Duffy, The Festo Decision and the Return of the Supreme Court to the Bar of
Patents, 2002 SUP. CT. REV. 273 (2002); David L. Schwartz, Explaining the Demise of
the Doctrine of Equivalents, 26 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1157 (2011); Martin J.
Adelman & Gary L. Francione, The Doctrine of Equivalents in Patent Law: Questions
that Pennwalt Did Not Answer, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 673 (1989); R. Polk Wagner,
Reconsidering Estoppel: Patent Administration and the Failure of Festo, 151 U. PA.
L. REV. 159 (2002); Matthew J. Conigliaro, Andrew C. Greenberg & Mark A. Lemley,
Foreseeability in Patent Law, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1045 (2001); Joshua D.
Sarnoff, Abolishing the Doctrine of Equivalents and Claiming the Future After Festo,
19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1157 (2004); Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the
Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839 (1990); S. Jay Plager,
Challenges for Intellectual Property Law in the Twenty-First Century: Indeterminacy
and Other Problems, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 69 (2001).
5
Allison & Lemley, supra note 4, at 967 (“The doctrine of equivalents is for all
intents and purposes dead, and has been for years, even as lawyers and judges were
seeing it as too expansive and struggling to cabin it.”).
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published in 2010 and 2011 concurred.6 More recently, this
appears to have changed. In a 2019 blog post titled Doctrine of
Equivalents is on Revival, Professor Crouch reported on a Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit decision finding for the
patentee.7 Barely a month later, he reported on another Federal
Circuit decision controversially declaring that “[t]he doctrine of
equivalents applies only in exceptional cases,” and then hastily
deleting the offending words “only in exceptional cases.”8
Is the doctrine truly on track for a revival? What does the
Federal Circuit’s slip reveal about some of its judges’ views on
cabining the doctrine? There has been unmistakably strong
academic interest in this controversial doctrine over the years.9
These debates have intrinsic value; they serve to highlight the
doctrine’s continued significance in both the academic literature
and in the courts.10 They also question the central conclusion in

6
Petherbridge, supra note 1, at 1385–86 (“As a definitional matter, the doctrine
is ‘in decline’ if there is a decrease in the average frequency of patentee success over
time.”). See also Schwartz, supra note 4, at 1158 (“The doctrine of equivalents had
been consistently applied by courts until its rapid ‘demise’ between the mid-1990s
and the mid-2000s.”).
7
Dennis Crouch, Doctrine of Equivalents is on Revival, PATENTLY-O (Aug. 9,
2019),
https://patentlyo.com/patent/2019/08/doctrine-equivalents-revival.html
[https://perma.cc/DXK9-SFYM] (describing the decision as “yet another strong
doctrine of equivalents decision”). See also Eli Lilly & Co. v. Hospira, Inc., 933 F.3d
1320, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (reversing the lower court’s finding of literal
infringement but affirming its finding of infringement under the doctrine of
equivalents), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 112 (2020).
8
Amgen Inc. v. Sandoz Inc., 923 F.3d 1023, 1029 (Fed. Cir.), reh’g granted in
part and denied in part per curiam, 776 F. App’x 707, 707 (Fed. Cir. 2019). See also
Dennis Crouch, “Exceptional Case” Rule Does Not Apply to Doctrine of Equivalents,
PATENTLY-O (Sept. 3, 2019) [hereinafter Crouch, “Exceptional Case”],
https://patentlyo.com/patent/2019/09/exceptional-doctrine-equivalents.html
[https://perma.cc/RDB6-ZMUR] (noting that the court’s earlier statement was “a
major step without precedential backing”). Professor Crouch continued:
It is possible that the court was simply intending to state that [doctrine of
equivalents] is rare. The decision was so problematic though because
“exceptional case” is a term of art used elsewhere in patent law and
suggests creation of an additional test prior to allowing a patentee to rely
upon [doctrine of equivalents].
Id.
9
See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
10
Timothy J. Douros, Lending the Federal Circuit a Hand: An Economic
Interpretation of the Doctrine of Equivalents, 10 HIGH TECH. L.J. 321, 322 (1995)
(“Nowhere in the patent law is such uniformity more needed than in application of
the doctrine of equivalents.”); Petherbridge, supra note 1, at 1372–73 (“Highly
visible internal disputes and outcry from the bar have been paralleled by Supreme
Court review in some of the Court’s most famous patent cases of the modern era.”).
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the Allison-Lemley study—that the doctrine of equivalents
remains dead.
Drawing on independently curated data, this Article shows
that the doctrine has not merely experienced a revitalization, but
rather that it has evolved and penetrated industries that lie at
the forefront of the nation’s economy.11 Corroborating evidence
also suggests that the decline reported in the Allison-Lemley
study may represent a slice of what appears to be a cyclical ebb
in the vitality of the doctrine rather than a downward spiral.12
Indeed, even with its pessimistic prognostication, the AllisonLemley study acknowledged that patentees routinely invoked the
doctrine of equivalents during the period under study.13 The
revitalization this Article observes may foreshadow a continued
increase in patentee wins with important ripple effects on
parties’ calculus of both settlement and licensing rates, with
broader implications on the law on innovation that lie outside
this Article’s scope.14
This Article makes a second and equally important
contribution to the literature: it unveils precisely how modern
courts apply the doctrine of equivalents, which has important
implications for both theory and practice. Doctrinally, every
doctrine of equivalents decision is fact specific, eliding rote
application of formulaic or mechanistic rules.15 Each case
provides a piece—a datapoint—of the full puzzle. Only by
stepping back to see how the pieces fit together can an evidence-

11

See infra Section III.A.
See infra Section III.A.
13
Allison & Lemley, supra note 4, at 977 (“[A] patentee is almost always arguing
the doctrine of equivalents as an alternative to a theory of literal infringement.”); see
also Kurt L. Glitzenstein, A Normative and Positive Analysis of the Scope of the
Doctrine of Equivalents, 7 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 281, 290 (1994) (“The doctrine of
equivalents is frequently raised, typically in the alternative to a charge of literal
infringement, in patent infringement actions.”); Mircea Tipescu, Future Trends on
the
Doctrine
of
Equivalents?,
LEXOLOGY
(May
15,
2019),
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=0d00b2b9-ac39-4a9a-85f84bbf36a2e5ef [https://perma.cc/43ER-CAUU] (“Claims of infringement under the
doctrine of equivalents routinely accompany literal infringement claims in patent
infringement litigation.”).
14
Cf. Allison & Lemley, supra note 4, at 977–78.
15
Id. at 977 (“Doctrine of equivalents cases are quite fact-specific, and one
explanation for the indifference of results to the legal standards is that judges are
simply making a gut determination of whether the accused device is sufficiently
similar to the patented invention.”); Jonathon Taylor Reavill, Note, Tipping the
Balance: Hilton Davis and the Shape of Equity in the Doctrine of Equivalents, 38
WM. & MARY L. REV. 319, 329 (1996).
12
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based response be provided to the questions and assertions of
stakeholders. In practice, commentators have long bemoaned the
poor performance of courts applying the doctrine.16 They stress
the need for a better understanding and articulation of the
doctrine, which would enable rivals to legitimately design around
patents.17 If that quest for clarity fails, it creates a risk of
unnecessarily chilling investment in research and development.18
An analysis of contemporary case data reveals the doctrine’s data
and evolution.
This Article tests conventional wisdom about the doctrine of
equivalents against 351 Federal Circuit and district court cases
decided between 2009 and 2019, including Federal Circuit Rule
36 summary affirmances with no opinion.19 The most recent
empirical study conducted in 2009 picks up from an earlier study
that concluded in 2008.20 The 2009 study is also the most
complete study. The 351 cases studied provided a total of 12,361
datapoints and addressed different issues that informed the
conclusion of the doctrine’s revitalization.

16
See Glitzenstein, supra note 13, at 309 (“[A]ny effort to reconcile the myriad
decisions into a coherent vision is Sisyphean.”); see also Dennis Crouch, Federal
Circuit: “The Doctrine of Equivalents Applies ONLY in Exceptional Cases”,
PATENTLY-O
(May
8,
2019),
https://patentlyo.com/patent/2019/05/doctrineequivalents-exceptional.html [https://perma.cc/VG48-U2JU] (disagreeing on whether
the 2019 Federal Circuit case of Amgen Inc. v. Sandoz Inc. was “a major step
without precedential backing” or was likely not intended to signal a new standard
for the doctrine of equivalents).
17
Adelman & Francione, supra note 4, at 683; see also Allison & Lemley, supra
note 4, at 956–57 (summarizing concerns that the doctrine “was swallowing the
rule,” and “that it ‘lack[ed] a coherent vision’ ” (quoting Meurer & Nard, supra note
4, at 1949)).
18
Donald S. Chisum, The Scope of Protection for Patents After the Supreme
Court’s Warner-Jenkinson Decision: The Fair Protection—Certainty Conundrum, 14
SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 1, 6–7 (1998) (“There is clearly an
interest in providing a clear definition of the scope of the patent right; lack of clarity
can impede legitimate investment in technology-based products and services.”); see
also James K. Folker, A Legislative Proposal to Clarify and Simplify Patent
Infringement Analysis Under the Doctrine of Equivalents, 6 FED. CIR. B.J. 211, 233
(1996) (“Both the lack of predictability and the inadequate public notice resulting
from the current state of doctrine of equivalents jurisprudence have a number of
serious repercussions on individual patentees and their competitors which, when
considered industry-wide, may hinder innovation in the country as a whole.”).
19
See Ryan T. Holte & Ted Sichelman, Cycles of Obviousness, 105 IOWA L. REV.
107, 136 & n.220 (2019) (indicating that Federal Circuit Rule 36 decisions provide
confidence in the comprehensiveness of the dataset).
20
Schwartz, supra note 4, at 1182 (reporting on a database of appellate
decisions from 1991 to 2008).
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Part I introduces the doctrine and underscores the dueling
policies of fairness to the patentee and notice to the public that
animate each case. It sets out tests that courts apply and the
boundaries that those courts laid down to preserve the balance
between fairness and notice.
Part II transitions the discussion into the empirical study
that lies at the heart of this Article. It places this Article in the
context of earlier studies and explains how its findings fill both
temporal and substantive gaps in the literature. It also provides
context for the discussion by identifying the variables presented
in the dataset, elucidating on their significance, and setting out
the boundaries of this Article’s limitations.
Part III presents this Article’s empirical findings on the
vitality of the doctrine of equivalents and charts both its
application and evolution. These findings show that patentees
enjoy double the rate of success today than they did ten years ago
and that the doctrine has evolved to feature in some of the most
prominent industries in the modern economy. Specifically,
patentees succeed on the merits in about one in five cases.21
Computer and communications-related inventions, as well as
drug and medical device-related inventions, dominated the
industry sectors; both overtaking mechanical inventions, which
dominated just a few years before.22
The doctrine has received considerable attention at the
Federal Circuit, with large skews on relative influence and
ideology toward the doctrine. Chief Judge Prost, Judge Lourie,
and Judge Reyna made the most determinations in doctrine of
equivalents cases. Based on frequency alone, these three may
have been most influential among Federal Circuit judges in
shaping our contemporary understanding of the doctrine of
equivalents.23 On the merits, Judge Linn, Judge Taranto, Judge
Moore, and Judge Rader decided most often in favor of patentees.
Judge Stoll, Judge Hughes, Judge O’Malley, Judge Bryson, and
Judge Lourie decided most often in favor of alleged infringers.
The data indicates Judge Lourie, who authored the corrected
Federal Circuit opinion Professor Crouch reported on in 2019, as
having an outsized role in shaping how we perceive the doctrine

21
22
23

See infra Section III.A.
See infra Section III.B.
See infra Section III.C.
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today and is one judge who is decidedly in favor of alleged
infringers.24
On the doctrinal front, courts today favor using the functionway-result test in operationalizing the doctrine of equivalents,
though a significant number treat it interchangeably with the
insubstantial differences test, with success rates that are lower
than their counterparts in the Allison-Lemley study.25
Surprisingly, most cases did not discuss limits to the doctrine of
equivalents despite these being an easy way for alleged
infringers to get themselves off the hook.26 Where they did
appear, prosecution history estoppel dominated, followed by the
all-elements rule, the public dedication rule, and the prior art
bar, with accused infringers succeeding most often in prosecution
history estoppel cases.27 As to the exceptions to prosecution
history estoppel, tangentiality was most frequently raised, with
unforeseeability a distant second and “some other reason”
appearing in only one instance, with patentees succeeding most
often with tangentiality.28
On issues of interest to practitioners, most cases arose from
the Third Circuit district courts, particularly from the District of
Delaware, due to its popularity as the state of incorporation for
many companies.29 District courts in the Third Circuit, Seventh
Circuit, and Ninth Circuit were most likely to find for
patentees.30 On appeal, the Federal Circuit affirmed most
district court determinations regardless of the outcome below,
with cases originating from the Second Circuit, Third Circuit,
and Ninth Circuit leading the pack.31
Most cases saw accused infringers employing a strategy of
seeking dismissals of infringement suits against them via
summary judgment motions of non-infringement at the district
courts with good success.32 Cases in which the parties were
competitors dominated. When parties were rivals, courts found
for patentees on the merits in about one in four cases, and when
24

See infra Section III.C.
See infra Section III.D.
26
See infra Section III.D.
27
See infra Section III.D.
28
See infra Section III.D.
29
See infra Section III.D.
30
See infra Section III.D. Patentee district court win rates were as follows:
Third Circuit (26%), Seventh Circuit (24%), and Tenth Circuit (33%).
31
See infra Section III.D.
32
See infra Section III.D.
25
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parties were not rivals, courts found for patentees in about one in
This Article concludes by highlighting key
eight cases.33
takeaways and identifying promising avenues for further
research.
I. A PRIMER TO THE DOCTRINE OF EQUIVALENTS
This section sets out the doctrinal and policy context of the
empirical study of this Article. Section A introduces the dueling
policies animating every doctrine of equivalents case—on the one
hand, fairness in providing adequate patent scope to the
patentee, and on the other hand, fairness in providing adequate
notice to the public. Section B describes how courts decipher the
substance and nature of the invention. Section C explains how
courts bridle the doctrine to achieve a balance between these
dueling policies through the four judicial levers: prosecution
history estoppel, the “all-elements” rule, the public dedication
rule, and the prior art bar.
A.

Dueling Policies

Patents encourage innovation by giving inventors of new and
nonobvious technologies a right to control who makes, uses, and
sells inventions embodying their patented technology.34 Those
rights are defined by patent claims, which courts liken to the
“metes and bounds” of a real property deed.35 Infringement
occurs when someone uses a patentee’s inventive concept without
permission. When this happens, a court may find the accused
infringer guilty through literal infringement—reading the plain
meaning of the patent claims.36
Alternatively, courts may find the accused infringer
infringed the patent claims by misappropriating the patentee’s

33

See infra Section III.A.
35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2010).
35
See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2012) (“The specification shall conclude with one or more
claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the
inventor or a joint inventor regards as the invention.”); see also Giles S. Rich, Extent
of Protection and Interpretation of Claims—American Perspectives, 21 INT’L REV.
INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 497, 499 (1990) (“[T]he name of the game is the
claim.”); Corning Glass Works v. Sumitomo Elec. U.S.A., Inc., 868 F.2d 1251, 1257
(Fed. Cir. 1989).
36
Duffy, supra note 4, at 280 (“A patentee’s right to exclude others is normally
defined by the literal language of the patent ‘claims’ . . . .”).
34
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inventive concept despite not infringing literally.37 This doctrine
“casts around a claim a penumbra which also must be avoided if
there is to be no infringement.”38 Professor Duffy observed that
“it might accurately be described as the exception to the general
rule that a patentee’s rights are defined by the literal language of
the claim.”39
In either case, attorneys drafting claims need to identify
contingencies ahead of time and word their claims carefully to
capture the broadest claim scope supported by the patent’s
disclosure.40 Yet even the most adroit attorney will fail to
adequately capture everything because the fact is that words
were made for things and not things for words.41 As the Supreme
Court observed:
An invention exists most importantly as a tangible structure or
a series of drawings.
A verbal portrayal is usually an
afterthought written to satisfy the requirements of patent law.
This conversion of machine to words allows for unintended idea
gaps which cannot be satisfactorily filled. Often the invention is
novel and words do not exist to describe it. The dictionary does
not always keep abreast of the inventor. It cannot. Things are
not made for the sake of words, but words for things.42

The doctrine of equivalents encourages patentees to innovate
by protecting the substance of their claimed inventions,43 while
deterring infringers from appropriating inventions in cases
where words may not adequately capture the essence of the
To do otherwise would be to allow minor,
invention.44
inconsequential changes to misappropriate the fruits of the

37
Sanitary Refrigerator Co. v. Winters, 280 U.S. 30, 41–42 (1929) (“There is a
substantial identity, constituting infringement, where a device is a copy of the thing
described by the patentee, ‘either without variation, or with such variations as are
consistent with its being in substance the same thing.’ ” (quoting Burr v. Duryee, 68
U.S. 531, 573 (1863)).
38
Autogiro Co. of Am. v. United States, 384 F.2d 391, 400 (Ct. Cl. 1967).
39
Duffy, supra note 4, at 280.
40
Meurer & Nard, supra note 4, at 1951–52.
41
Duffy, supra note 4, at 306 (“Unlike physical property, innovations occupy the
realm of the conceptual and, as innovations, they are also new and nonobvious. The
task for the law is thus to define accurately rights to incorporeal matters residing on
the forefront of human knowledge.”).
42
Autogiro Co., 384 F.2d at 397.
43
See Cabell v. Markham, 148 F.2d 737, 739 (2d Cir.) (“[I]t is one of the surest
indexes of a mature and developed jurisprudence not to make a fortress out of the
dictionary . . . .”), aff’d, 326 U.S. 404 (1945).
44
1 LESTER HORWITZ, ETHAN HORWITZ & LISA HERSHMAN, PATENT OFFICE
RULES & PRACTICE § 111(A)(2)(a) (1992).

74

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 95:65

inventor’s efforts.45 On the other hand, rivals are entitled to
compete with clear notice of what patent claims embrace so they
can properly design around them.46 All that is required is that
the skilled person in the art can read claims to understand the
scope of the patent and avoid infringement.47
Ironically, the earliest American patents did not require
claims. Instead, infringement focused entirely on the “essence” of
the patented device through an inquiry into equivalents.48
Patentees risked jurors⎯faced with the difficult task of divining
how the invention worked⎯relying on superficial differences to
conclude that the two inventions were dissimilar.49 In 1836,
Congress removed the task of “ascertaining the exact invention of
the patentee by inference and conjecture” from the courts.50
From then on, a patentee had to “particularly specify and point
out the part, improvement, or combination, which he claims as
his own invention or discovery.”51 Claims now allowed inventors
to define their inventions in broad terms and assert their rights.52
45

See Chisum, supra note 18, at 7 (“[S]trict and literal adherence to the written
claim in determining the scope of protection can invite subversion of a valuable right
and substantially diminish the economic value of patents.”).
46
See Min-Chiuan Wang, Nuisance Law and the Doctrine of Equivalents in
Patent Law, 34 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J. 110, 146 (2018) (“[T]hese tests are all
designed to determine whether the accused infringer took the use of the inventive
concept of the patent in question. Purely taking the inventive concept of a patent
without making a substantial change falls under ‘moving along the Pareto frontier,’
rather than ‘shifting the frontier outward.’ ”).
47
Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (noting
the “bedrock principle” of patent law that claims define the scope of a patent), cert.
denied, 546 U.S. 1170 (2006).
48
See Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, § 2, 1 Stat. 109, 110 (repealed 1793); Patent Act
of 1793, ch. 11, § 2, 1 Stat. 318, 318 (repealed 1836); see also Odiorne v. Winkley, 18
F. Cas. 581, 582 (C.C.D. Mass. 1814) (No. 10,432); see also ROBERT PATRICK MERGES
& JOHN FITZGERALD DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND POLICY: CASES AND MATERIALS 711
(7th ed. 2017) (noting that “the exception to the modern rule—the doctrine of
equivalents—is older than the rule itself”).
49
Odiorne, 18 F. Cas. at 582 (recognizing that this was “often a point of intrinsic
difficulty”); see also Duffy, supra note 4, at 309 (discussing this difficulty).
50
Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, § 6, 5 Stat. 117 (1836); Keystone Bridge Co. v.
Phoenix Iron Co., 95 U.S. 274, 278 (1877).
51
Ch. 357, § 6, 5 Stat. 117. The United States was first legal system to introduce
claims. Now it is the norm. Other systems have come up with same function:
purposive construction under English law. See, e.g., Catnic Components Ltd. v. Hill
& Smith Ltd., [1982] R.P.C. 183, 243; Kirin-Amgen, Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel
Ltd. [2004] UKHL 46, [30].
52
See Carver v. Braintree Mfg. Co., 5 F. Cas. 235, 238 (C.C.D. Mass. 1843)
(noting that claims helped the patentee to “guard[ ] himself against the suggestion,
that his invention consists solely in a particular form . . . and [to] claim[ ] the
invention to be his, whether the exact form is preserved, or not”); see also Duffy,
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The Supreme Court initially used specifications to find the
scope of an invention.53 This would foreshadow a time when
equivalents analysis would become the exception to claim
interpretation fifteen years later.54 Words inadequately describe
the full range of an invention’s points of novelty or fail to capture
its nuances. Literalism, while efficient, is ineffective where it
may well matter—when rivals make insubstantial changes to
escape the literal wording of patent claims. In these instances,
the doctrine of equivalents still allows patentees to ensnare
them.55
In any case, the Supreme Court has consistently been
concerned that the doctrine, “when applied broadly, conflicts with
the definitional and public-notice functions of the statutory
claiming requirement.”56 For instance, in his dissent in a
seminal doctrine of equivalents case, Graver Tank &
Manufacturing Co., decided in 1950, Justice Black warned the
doctrine would result in claims becoming “ ‘like a nose of wax,
which may be turned and twisted in any direction . . . so as to
make it include something more than, or something different
from, what its words express.’ ”57 A unanimous Supreme Court
endorsed the doctrine nearly thirty years later in WarnerJenkinson Co., and cautioned that it “has taken on a life of its
own, unbounded by the patent claims.”58
Over the years, judges devised several ways to bind and
brindle the doctrine. First, judges clarified that an equivalents
analysis “must be applied to individual elements of the claim, not
to the invention as a whole.”59 Second, the patentee had to
establish the reason for a prosecution-related amendment.60 If

supra note 4, at 310 (“The claim was the friend of the patentee; it helped to expand
patent rights.”).
53
See Winans v. Denmead, 56 U.S. 330, 340 (1853); Duffy, supra note 4, at 311
(“[Winans] is now cited by the modern Supreme Court as the origin of the doctrine of
equivalents.”).
54
Fay v. Cordesman, 109 U.S. 408, 421 (1883) (“[Claims] must be regarded as
material, leaving open only the question whether an omitted part is supplied by an
equivalent device or instrumentality [in the accused product].”).
55
See Festo II, 535 U.S. 722, 733 (2002), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 988 (2004), and
aff’d, 493 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
56
Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 29 (1997).
57
Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 614 (1950)
(Black, J., dissenting) (quoting White v. Dunbar, 119 U.S. 47, 51 (1886)).
58
Warner-Jenkinson Co., 520 U.S. at 28–29.
59
Id. at 29.
60
See id. at 33.
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the patentee could not, the court prohibited them from employing
the doctrine for the amended portion of the claim.61 If the
patentee succeeded in providing a reason, the court “would decide
whether that reason is sufficient to overcome prosecution history
estoppel as a bar to application of the doctrine of equivalents to
the element added by that amendment.”62
Third, by leveraging on claim interpretation being a question
of law rather than one of fact, judges can hem the jury into a pen
where the jury’s literal infringement deliberations fit snugly
within the contours of judicially-determined reasonableness.63
Fourth, the judge rather than the jury calls the balls and strikes
when either party brings a motion for summary judgment, a
motion for judgment as a matter of law (“JMOL”), or as we will
see in Section II.C., through judicial limitations on the doctrine
itself.64 In every one of these three instances, judges must still
employ one of two threshold tests, either individually or together.
B.

Tests

“Insubstantiality” is the buzzword when it comes to
equivalents. An element in an accused product is equivalent to a
claim limitation if the differences between the two are
“insubstantial” to one of ordinary skill in the art.65 Judges
generally treat insubstantiality as a question of whether the
accused device “performs substantially the same function in
substantially the same way to obtain the same result” as the

61
See Festo II, 535 U.S. 722, 737–38 (2002), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 988 (2004),
and aff’d, 493 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
62
Warner-Jenkinson Co., 520 U.S. at 33.
63
See London v. Carson Pirie Scott & Co., 946 F.2d 1534, 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1991)
(warning that it is “the exception, however, not the rule,” and not merely “the second
prong of every infringement charge, regularly available to extend protection beyond
the scope of the claims”); see also Eli Lilly & Co. v. Hospira, Inc., 933 F.3d 1320, 1330
(Fed. Cir. 2019) (“Patent infringement is principally determined by examining
whether the accused subject matter falls within the scope of the claims.”).
64
See, e.g., Festo II, 535 U.S. at 737–41 (prosecution history estoppel); WarnerJenkinson Co., 520 U.S. at 39 n.8 (“[A] theory of equivalence [cannot] entirely vitiate
a particular claim element . . . .”); Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co.,
339 U.S. 605, 608–09 (1950); Johnson & Johnston Assocs. Inc. v. R.E. Serv. Co., Inc.,
285 F.3d 1046, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (en banc) (subject matter disclosed but not
claimed is dedicated to the public); Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. David Geoffrey &
Assocs., 904 F.2d 677, 683 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (“[T]he asserted scope of equivalency
[cannot] encompass the prior art.” (citations omitted)).
65
Warner–Jenkinson Co., 520 U.S. at 40.
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claim limitation.66 Here, courts assess if “an element in the
accused device is equivalent to a claim limitation if it ‘performs
substantially the same function in substantially the same way to
obtain substantially the same result.’ ”67
The “function-way-result” test demands a single result and a
single function.68 Sometimes each invention may produce many
results and have many functions.69 At other times, the “function”
and the “result” may be essentially the same thing,70 and
“[b]ecause the accused infringers are often competitors of the
patentees, the accused device and the patented device normally
have the same function and result, and thus the determination
Moreover, the
normally turns on the ‘way’ component.”71
“function-way-result” test merely gives the purpose and goal of
claim elements, but does not define the invention. The “way” an
element operates only supplies “the means or mechanism by
which it operates, but it does not reliably tell what the invention
is [because that] is what structural terms in claims are for.”72
When the Supreme Court introduced its “function-wayresult” test for the doctrine of equivalents, the Court emphasized
that the doctrine was not a “prisoner of a formula.”73 So in 1997,
the Court endorsed a second, “insubstantial differences” test, as
an alternative while declining to choose one over the other.74 The

66
Graver Tank & Mfg. Co., 339 U.S. at 608 (quoting Sanitary Refrigerator Co. v.
Winters, 280 U.S. 30, 42 (1929)); see also W.L. Gore & Assocs. v. Medtronic, Inc., 874
F. Supp. 2d 526, 542 (E.D. Va. 2012), aff’d, 530 F. App’x 939 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
67
Voda v. Cordis Corp., 536 F.3d 1311, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (quoting Schoell v.
Regal Marine Indus., Inc., 247 F.3d 1202, 1209–10 (Fed. Cir. 2001)).
68
See Kemco Sales, Inc. v. Control Papers Co., 208 F.3d 1352, 1364 (Fed. Cir.
2000).
69
Glitzenstein, supra note 13, at 306 (“An invention, however, typically
produces myriad results and has many functions, whereas the tripartite test
demands the isolation of a single result and a single function.”).
70
See Donald R. Dunner & J. Michael Jakes, The Equitable Doctrine of
Equivalents, 75 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y. 857, 863–64 & n.42 (1993).
71
Folker, supra note 18, at 228; see also Perkin-Elmer Corp. v. Westinghouse
Elec. Corp., 822 F.2d 1528, 1532 n.6 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
72
Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1546 (Fed.
Cir. 1995) (Lourie, J., dissenting), rev’d, 520 U.S. 17 (1997).
73
Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 609 (1950); see
also Festo II, 535 U.S. 722, 727 (2002) (“[B]y extending protection beyond the literal
terms in a patent the doctrine of equivalents can create substantial uncertainty
about where the patent monopoly ends.”), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 988 (2004), and
aff’d, 493 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
74
Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 40 (1997)
(“[T]he particular linguistic framework used is less important than whether the test
is probative of the essential inquiry . . . .”).
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“insubstantial differences” test focuses on whether insubstantial
change adds anything of significance “to the structure, material,
or acts disclosed in” the relevant patent specification.75 Judges
sometimes expressly treat the two concepts as distinct and then
proceed to apply both tests. 76 Others treat them coextensively.77
The Supreme Court admitted that “the insubstantial
differences test offers little additional guidance as to what might
render any given difference ‘insubstantial.’ ”78 Describing the
“insubstantial differences test” as “elusive and frustrating,”
commentators note that “the Federal Circuit has not, and
probably will never, set out a definitive formula for determining
whether an element of an accused device is a ‘substantial
equivalent’ of a claim limitation pertaining to a claim element.”79
In either case, patentees must provide particularized
testimony and linking argument to that insubstantiality.80
Patentees do so “through testimony of experts or others versed in
the technology; by documents, including texts and treatises; and
of course, by the disclosures of the prior art.”81 Patentees who
pitch expert testimony at an abstract level, untethered to
contemporaneous or supporting evidence, will see their claim for
infringement short-lived.82 Conversely, defendants who admit
that their minor changes do not add functionality to the
invention, but who did so solely to design around the patented
invention, may risk liability for infringement or dismissal of their

75

Valmont Indus., Inc. v. Reinke Mfg. Co., Inc., 983 F.2d 1039, 1043 (Fed. Cir.

1993).
76

See, e.g., Voda v. Cordis Corp., 536 F.3d 1311, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2008)
(describing “two articulations of the test for equivalence,” the function-way-result
test and the insubstantial differences test).
77
See e.g., Wm. Wrigley Jr. Co. v. Cadbury Adams USA LLC, 631 F. Supp. 2d
1010, 1041–44 (N.D. Ill. 2009).
78
Warner-Jenkinson Co., 520 U.S. at 40.
79
Sean T. Moorhead, Note, The Doctrine of Equivalents: Rarely Actionable NonLiteral Infringement or the Second Prong of Patient Infringement Charges?, 53 OHIO
ST. L.J. 1421, 1433 (1992).
80
See, e.g., Texas Instruments, Inc. v. Cypress Semiconductor Corp., 90 F.3d
1558, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (“[A] patentee must still provide particularized testimony
and linking argument as to the ‘insubstantiality of the differences’ between the
claimed invention and the accused device or process, or with respect to the function,
way, result test.”), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1228 (1997).
81
Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 609 (1950).
82
See TQ Delta, LLC v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 942 F.3d 1352, 1359–61 (Fed. Cir. 2019)
(warning against relying on conclusory expert testimony).
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motion for summary judgment of noninfringement.83 As the next
section shows, for patentees who succeed, the gauntlet that they
must run continues as accused infringers may argue that one or
more judicial limits apply to extinguish their claims under the
doctrine of equivalents.
C.

Limits to Equivalents

The courts have erected four bars to the doctrine of
equivalents: prosecution history estoppel, the “all-elements” rule,
the prior art bar, and the public dedication rule.84 Each penalizes
patentees “for sloppy or overly aggressive patent drafting and for
strategic behaviors that shift the cost of information about the
legal scope of an invention from an inventor to the Patent Office
and the public.”85 These limits complement the underlying
factual question of infringement that a jury must answer. These
bars also temper jury verdicts that threaten to upset the balance
between the dueling policies of fairness to the patentee and
notice to the public by improperly favoring the former over the
latter.86
1.

Prosecution History Estoppel

Prosecution history is the public record of the
correspondence between patent applicants and examiners during
the prosecution process. Just as legislative history aids statutory
interpretation, prosecution history illuminates the breadth of
claims.87 The estoppel usually arises when applicants narrow
their claims in response to objections that the original wording is
83
See, e.g., Gemalto S.A. v. HTC Corp., 754 F.3d 1364, 1374–75 (Fed. Cir. 2014);
see also Cimline, Inc. v. Crafco, Inc., 672 F. Supp. 2d 916, 929 (D. Minn. 2009), rev’d
on other grounds, 413 F. App’x 240 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
84
See generally MARTIN J. ADELMAN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON PATENT
LAW § 12.4 (5th ed. 2019).
85
Lee Petherbridge, On the Development of Patent Law, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
893, 927 (2010).
86
EveryScape, Inc. v. Adobe Sys., Inc., 31 F. Supp. 3d 322, 325 (D. Mass. 2014)
(“Ensnarement, like prosecution history estoppel, limits the scope of equivalency
that a patentee is allowed to assert. This limitation is imposed even if a jury has
found equivalence as to each claim element.”).
87
See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 987 (Fed. Cir.
1995) (comparing prosecution history to legislative history), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370
(1996); see also 37 C.F.R. § 1.11(a) (2012) (declaring that prosecution history
becomes public post-issuance); Provisions for Claiming the Benefit of a Provisional
Application With a Non-English Specification and Other Miscellaneous Matters, 70
Fed. Reg. 56119-02, 56119–20, 56126 (Sept. 26, 2005) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt.
1).
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not enabled or is unpatentable in view of the prior art, and
broaden them later.88 Accordingly, patentees who disclaim
embodiments during the prosecution process cannot recover
those embodiments at trial through the doctrine.89 They, not the
courts, bear the responsibility of negotiating claims that are
broad enough to cover compositions that could be equivalent.90
“Prosecution history estoppel can occur in two ways: ‘either
(1) by making a narrowing amendment to the claim
(“amendment-based estoppel”) or (2) by surrendering claim scope
through argument to the patent examiner (“argument-based
estoppel”)’ ” constituting “ ‘a clear and unmistakable surrender of
subject matter.’ ” 91 Applicants setting forth multiple reasons for
distinguishing their invention from prior art may find each
reason creating separate estoppels.92
When the accused infringer prevails in raising prosecution
history estoppel, the ball is in the patentee’s court and they must
now explain to the court why estoppel should not in fact apply.93
The Supreme Court in Festo II set out three exceptions to
prosecution history estoppel.94
First, when the alleged equivalent was already known at the
time of the patent application filing, “one of ordinary skill in the
art would not be on notice that the claimed invention relates to
similar compounds that are known but not claimed.”95 If the

88
See Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1460 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en
banc) (illustrating how a narrowing argument leads to estoppel), abrogated by Power
Integrations, Inc. v. Fairchild Semiconductor Int’l, Inc., 904 F.3d 965 (Fed. Cir.
2018).
89
See Exhibit Supply Co. v. Ace Patents Corp., 315 U.S. 126, 137 (1942);
Conigliaro, Greenberg & Lemley, supra note 4, at 1064–65 (explaining how
prosecution history estoppel is “based on the equitable concept of an implied
promise”).
90
Sage Prods., Inc. v. Devon Indus., Inc., 126 F.3d 1420, 1425 (Fed. Cir. 1997)
(“[A]s between the patentee who had a clear opportunity to negotiate broader claims
but did not do so, and the public at large, it is the patentee who must bear the cost of
its failure to seek protection for this foreseeable alteration of its claimed structure.”).
91
Amgen Inc. v. Coherus BioSciences Inc., 931 F.3d 1154, 1159–60 (Fed. Cir.
2019) (quoting Conoco, Inc. v. Energy & Env’t Int’l, L.C., 460 F.3d 1349, 1363–64
(Fed. Cir. 2006)).
92
PODS, Inc. v. Porta Stor, Inc., 484 F.3d 1359, 1367 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied,
552 U.S. 1022 (2007).
93
Festo II, 535 U.S. 722, 741 (2002), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 988 (2004), and aff’d,
493 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
94
Id. at 740–41.
95
Wm. Wrigley Jr. Co. v. Cadbury Adams USA LLC, 631 F. Supp. 2d 1010, 1043
(N.D. Ill. 2009).
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equivalent was foreseeable, a patentee should have claimed it.96
In contrast, “one of ordinary skill in the art would be on notice
that similar compounds discovered after the patent issued could
infringe the patent in question because of the unforeseeability of
the equivalent.”97
The second way patentees can rebut the prosecution history
is to show that the amendment bears little to no relationship to
the asserted equivalent.98 The inquiry focuses on the patentee’s
“objectively apparent reason for the narrowing amendment.”99
The patentee could not have voluntarily surrendered the
equivalent if subject matter related to a different aspect of the
invention.100 Patentees therefore need to show the way that an
alleged equivalent departs from what the claim limitation
literally requires.101 Unfortunately, there is “still no consistent
definition for when a narrowing amendment is tangential.”102
The third and final way patentees can rebut prosecution
history estoppel is to show that there is “some other reason” for
narrowing the amendment.103 The court explained that this
96
See Sage Prods., Inc. v. Devon Indus., Inc., 126 F.3d 1420, 1425 (Fed. Cir.
1997) (“[No] subsequent change in the state of the art, such as later-developed
technology, obfuscated the significance of [the] limitation at the time of its
incorporation into the claim.”). But see Ring & Pinion Serv. Inc. v. ARB Corp., 743
F.3d 831, 834 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“There is not, nor has there ever been, a
foreseeability limitation on the application of the doctrine of equivalents. It has long
been clear that known interchangeability weighs in favor of finding infringement
under the doctrine of equivalents.” (citing Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis
Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 36 (1997))).
97
Wm. Wrigley Jr. Co., 631 F. Supp. 2d at 1043.
98
Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co. (Festo III), 344 F.3d
1359, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
99
Id.
100
See Biagro W. Sales, Inc. v. Grow More, Inc., 423 F.3d 1296, 1306 (Fed. Cir.
2005).
101
See, e.g. Insituform Techs., Inc. v. CAT Contracting, Inc., 385 F.3d 1360,
1362–63 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (addressing claims requiring single vacuum source placed
near the resin when tangential source claims over a method of using a vacuum to
impregnate flexible tube with resin originally rejected over a prior-art reference
disclosing single vacuum source located far away from the resin source. The
narrowing amendment distinguished the invention from the prior art based on the
location of the vacuum source relative to the resin, not to limit the number of
vacuum sources.).
102
Blaine Larson, How Tangential Does It Have to Be?: Making Sense of Festo’s
Tangential Limitations Doctrine, 48 HOUS. L. REV. 959, 961 (2011); Nicholas
Pumfrey et al., The Doctrine of Equivalents in Various Patent Regimes—Does
Anybody Have It Right?, 11 YALE J.L. & TECH. 261, 268 (2009) (arguing the term
“tangential” is “totally devoid of linguistic content as applied to patent law”).
103
See generally Erin Conway, Note, The Aftermath of Festo v. SMC: Is There
“Some Other Reason” for Justifying the Third Festo Rebuttal Criterion?, 82 CHI.-
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addressed “the shortcomings of language,”104 which means that
the equivalent could not be described with sufficient specificity in
the claim. Thus, if the equivalent is present in the prior art,
“ ‘there can be no other reason the patentee could not have
described the substitute in question.’ ”105 The court also noted
that, similar to the tangentiality inquiry, “[w]hen at all possible,
determination of the third rebuttal criterion should also be
limited to the prosecution history record.”106
2.

The All-Elements Rule

The doctrine of equivalents is applied to each element of the
claim and cannot eliminate an element.107 The “all elements”
rule requires judges to assess equivalents on a limitation-bylimitation basis rather than as a whole, and without reading any
limitation completely out of the claim.108 Factors “includ[e] the
simplicity of the structure, the specificity and narrowness of the
claim[s], and [like prosecution history estoppel] the foreseeability
of variations at the time of filing the claim with the [Patent
Office].”109 If an accused device does not contain at least an
equivalent for each limitation of the claim, there is no
infringement because a required part of the claimed invention is
missing. The “all-elements” rule thus works to prevent patentees
from using the doctrine to broaden a claim element to vitiate the
other claim elements.110
KENT L. REV. 1655, 1672–73, 1677–87 (2007) (analyzing the third Festo VIII
criterion).
104
Festo III, 344 F.3d 1359, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
105
Id.(quoting Pioneer Magnetics, Inc. v. Micro Linear Corp., 330 F.3d 1352,
1357 (Fed. Cir. 2003)).
106
Id.; See Kurt Van Thomme, Note, Prosecution History Estoppel After Festo:
Can an Equivalent Ever Break Through the File Wrapper?, 53 DRAKE L. REV. 1099,
1119 (2005) (“Unfortunately, this example is not particularly helpful, as it is
essentially a restatement of its example of a foreseeable equivalent under the first
analysis.”).
107
Abraxis Bioscience, Inc. v. Mayne Pharma (USA) Inc., 467 F.3d 1370, 1381–
82 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
108
DePuy Spine, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 469 F.3d 1005, 1016–17
(Fed. Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 940 (2007), and aff’d, 567 F.3d 1314 (Fed. Cir.
2009).
109
Freedman Seating Co. v. Am. Seating Co., 420 F.3d 1350, 1360 (Fed. Cir.
2005).
110
Deere & Co. v. Bush Hog, LLC, 703 F.3d 1349, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2012)
(“ ‘Vitiation’ is not an exception to the doctrine of equivalents, but instead a legal
determination that ‘the evidence is such that no reasonable jury could determine two
elements to be equivalent.’ ”) (quoting Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem.
Co., 520 U.S. 17, 39 n.8 (1997)).
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At the same time, this inquiry is not “a ‘binary’ choice in
which an element is either present or ‘not present’ ”; instead,
courts “examine . . . whether there is a genuine factual issue that
the accused device, while literally omitting a claim element,
nonetheless incorporates an equivalent structure.”111 Further,
courts have employed the rule flexibly, focusing on the net effect
of the interaction of the claim limitations rather than requiring
each one to perform in the way prescribed by the patent claim.112
The particularized analysis of the “all-elements” rule was meant
to better serve the notice function.113 In practice, however, courts
may have difficulty matching language and meaning. While the
“all-elements” rule constrains the doctrine by requiring a
mapping of elements, it does not prevent uncertainty springing
from how courts choose to define the elements of a claim.114
3.

The Prior Art Bar

Prior art limits what patentees can claim. Patentees cannot
seek a range of equivalents “ensnar[ing] the prior art”; thus, if
patentees could not have obtained a scope of claims from the
Patent Office, then the doctrine of equivalents would not allow
them to do so by a back door.115 The prior art bar applies
regardless of whether a single piece of prior art anticipates the

111

Id. at 1356–57.
Corning Glass Works v. Sumitomo Elec. U.S.A., Inc., 868 F.2d 1251, 1259
(Fed. Cir. 1989) (recognizing that the doctrine can sometimes be assessed by the
interplay among different elements).
113
Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. at 29–30. The
notice function is served by the all-elements rule as follows:
Each element contained in a patent claim is deemed material to defining
the scope of the patented invention, and thus the doctrine of equivalents
must be applied to individual elements of the claim, not to the invention as
a whole. It is important to ensure that the application of the doctrine, even
as to an individual element, is not allowed such broad play as to effectively
eliminate that element in its entirety. So long as the doctrine of equivalents
does not encroach beyond the limits just described, or beyond related
limits . . . we are confident that the doctrine will not vitiate the central
functions of the patent claims themselves.
Id.
114
Matthew C. Phillips, Taking a Step Beyond Maxwell to Tame the Doctrine of
Equivalents, 11 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 155, 162 (2000) (“The
definition of an ‘element’ is slippery and probably cannot be settled without some
resort to arbitrariness. Presently, an element seems to be more than just a single
word, but potentially less than an entire step in a method or an entire constituent
part of an apparatus . . . .”).
115
Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. David Geoffrey & Assocs., 904 F.2d 677, 684–85
(Fed. Cir. 1990).
112
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equivalent or if several pieces of prior art would together render
that equivalent obvious.116
To determine whether the patent would ensnare the alleged
equivalent, courts generally engage in the two-step hypothetical
claim analysis. First, the judge must visualize a hypothetical
patent claim sufficient to cover the accused product and
determine if the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office would have
allowed it over the prior art.117 Second, the accused infringer
must produce evidence of prior art to challenge the hypothetical
claim.118 If the hypothetical claim would be unpatentable for
anticipation under 35 U.S.C. § 102 or obviousness under 35
U.S.C. § 103, then the accused device will be non-infringing.119
4.

The Public Dedication Rule

The Federal Circuit articulated the public dedication rule in
2002.120 This rule discourages patentees from filing broad
disclosures and attempting to then circumvent examination by
presenting only narrow claims.121
Patentees may disclaim
equivalents by disclosing subject matter in the specification but
declining to claim it, thereby “dedicat[ing] th[e] unclaimed
Like prosecution history
subject matter to the public.”122
estoppel, the public dedication rule protects public reliance on
patentees who profess to surrender their patent scope during
patent prosecution—either gratuitously or so that they would
obtain the patents.123 They cannot then expand their claims to
cover it. Thus, if a patentee possessed a variation of the claimed
invention, or if a skilled person in the art would understand that
variation from the patent, then the patentee’s failure to claim it
would cause it to fall into the public domain.124
Disclosing generic references in a written specification does
not mean “all members of that particular genus [become
116

Key Mfg. Grp., Inc. v. Microdot, Inc., 925 F.2d 1444, 1449 (Fed. Cir. 1991)
(three prior art references would make the accused product obvious).
117
Wilson Sporting Goods Co., 904 F.2d at 684.
118
Interactive Pictures Corp. v. Infinite Pictures, Inc., 274 F.3d 1371, 1380 (Fed.
Cir. 2001), cert. denied 537 U.S. 825 (2002).
119
Id.
120
Johnson & Johnston Assocs. Inc. v. R.E. Serv. Co., Inc., 285 F.3d 1046, 1054
(Fed. Cir. 2002) (per curiam).
121
Id. at 1054–55.
122
Id. at 1054.
123
Petherbridge, supra note 1, at 1375.
124
PSC Comput. Prods., Inc. v. Foxconn Int’l, Inc., 355 F.3d 1353, 1360 (Fed.
Cir. 2004).
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dedicated] to the public.”125 “The disclosure must be of such
specificity that one of ordinary skill in the art could identify the
subject matter that had been disclosed and not claimed.”126
Further, “before unclaimed subject matter is deemed to have
been dedicated to the public, that unclaimed subject matter must
have been identified by the patentee as an alternative to a claim
limitation.”127
II. THE EMPIRICAL STUDY
The doctrine’s controversy draws many commentators into
its fold. Many commentators catalog developments in case law.128
Others have employed law and economics,129 mathematics,130 and
empirical methods.131 Earlier empirical studies examined factors
leading to the doctrine’s decline.132 These studies are now
between ten and twenty-eight years old, and their value in
understanding the modern contours of contemporary case law
diminished by time.133 The earlier studies also omitted jury
decisions, district court decisions, non-precedential decisions, and
unreported decisions, creating gaps in their datasets.134
125

Id.
Id.
127
Pfizer, Inc. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 429 F.3d 1364, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
128
Glitzenstein, supra note 13, at 309.
129
Douros, supra note 10, at 324, 330–33.
130
Raj S. Davé, A Mathematical Approach to Claim Elements and the Doctrine of
Equivalents, 16 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 507, 529–57 (2003).
131
See Petherbridge, supra note 1, at 1380 (covering Federal Circuit decisions
over a “fifteen-year period spanning January 1, 1992 to May 2, 2007”); see also
Allison & Lemley, supra note 4, at 963 (covering “every district court and court of
appeals decision on the doctrine of equivalents that appeared in Westlaw and was
decided during three eighteen-month periods” between 1999 and 2005) (footnote
omitted); Darcy August Paul, The Judicial Doctrine of Equivalents, 17 HARV. J.L. &
TECH. 247, 248, 271–75 (2003) (covering the period between 1999 to 2002); Schwartz,
supra note 4, at 1182–83 (examining cases between 1991 and 2008).
132
Schwartz, supra note 4, at 1158–59 (summarizing earlier studies either
attributing the decline to trial courts displacing juries in construing patent claims or
to the Supreme Court’s Festo decision reducing the doctrine’s applicability); see also
id. at 1159 (attributing the decline to “ ‘doctrinal reallocation’ and ‘doctrinal
displacement.’ ”).
133
See supra note 131.
134
See Allison & Lemley, supra note 4, at 963–64 (omitting jury decisions to
focus on written decisions “to parse the grounds for decision and the reasoning of the
opinions”); id. at 976 (published opinions were a “representative subset of all
opinions”); Petherbridge, supra note 1, at 1378; see also Schwartz, supra note 4, at
1182–83 (focusing only on Federal Circuit cases); id. at 1186 (“[N]on-precedential
opinions typically are not as well organized. . . . This presents potential coding
difficulties.”).
126
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Literature Review

This Article distinguishes itself from the prior work, and
particularly past empirical studies. Those empirical studies
looked at factors leading to a decline in the use of the doctrine of
equivalents and the impact of precedent changes on the doctrine
of equivalents.135 This Article focuses on a different issue—
finding meaningful answers through the rich data that case
reports offer on the present vitality and scope of the doctrine, as
well as win rates and court dynamics.
As mentioned, past empirical studies are outdated since they
relied on cases decided between 1991 and 2008.136 This Article
presents contemporary data between 2009 and 2019. This
approach allows an intertemporal comparison to be made on
factors such as patentee win rates,137 the success of specific
doctrine of equivalents arguments,138 and variations in industry
representation and outcomes.139 It also contrasts with aspects of
the previous studies that relied on cases collected from discrete
periods and used measures of differences in outcomes between
periods to support its main hypothesis. By using a large data set
without gaps, this Article can track the impact of important
jurisprudential developments. This approach will also allow the
results to validate or refute the conclusion in earlier studies that
the doctrine of equivalents is in the decline due to the increased
judicial use of claim construction to reach the same results.
B.

Study Design

Empirical work aims to bring a more realistic, scientific
understanding of the effects of law on legal actors and legal
institutions. This Article employed case content analysis. This

135
See Allison & Lemley, supra note 4, at 957 (“[A]n empirical study of every
reported doctrine of equivalents decision in both the Federal Circuit and the district
courts during three periods—one before the Federal Circuit’s 2000 Festo opinion, one
after that opinion but before the Supreme Court’s 2002 opinion, and a third after the
Supreme Court’s opinion.”).
136
See supra note 131.
137
See Allison & Lemley, supra note 4, at 966 (“By far the most dramatic finding
of our study is that patentees rarely win doctrine of equivalents cases.”). The study
reported that patentees won “only 24%” of decided cases over the eight-year period
studied. Id.
138
See id. at 974–75.
139
See id. at 972–73 (noting that of 413 patent cases that featured the doctrine
of equivalents, 61.7% pertained to mechanical devices, while 6.5% related to
pharmaceuticals and finding little win-rate variation between industries).
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well-established method is used by legal scholars to parse
through judicial opinions to study how courts exercise discretion
and judgment in applying legal rules to the facts in intellectual
A Westlaw search for the doctrine of
property cases.140
equivalents returned 525 unfiltered decisions.141 A research
assistant helped filter out decisions that mentioned the doctrine
of equivalents without discussing it, returning with 351 cases.
She analyzed each opinion and hand-coded the dataset, which
was then reviewed, and the coding was checked for accuracy by
two other reviewers.142
The research assistant used a standardized set of coding
instructions:
(1) the decision’s date;
(2) the court where the case was decided;
(3) the case citation;
(4) whether the case repeated (to ensure cases were not
counted more than once when a variable, such as venue, remains
the same even as the number of claims warrant separate
reporting);
(5) the case’s procedural posture;
(6) the doctrinal test employed by the court, such as the
function-way-result test;

140

See Petherbridge, supra note 1, at 1380 (“Content analysis is capable of
helping scholars verify, analyze, or refute empirical claims about case law, and it is
to that purpose the approach is put in this study.”). For earlier studies where I
employed a similar methodology, see, for example, Lee Petherbridge et al., The
Federal Circuit and Inequitable Conduct: An Empirical Assessment, 84 S. CAL L.
REV. 1293, 1303–04 (2011); Mark A. Hall & Ronald F. Wright, Systematic Content
Analysis of Judicial Opinions, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 63, 77 (2008); DARYL LIM, PATENT
MISUSE AND ANTITRUST LAW: EMPIRICAL, DOCTRINAL AND POLICY PERSPECTIVES 8–
9 (2013); Daryl Lim, Patent Misuse and Antitrust: Rebirth or False Dawn?, 20 MICH.
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 299, 303–04 (2014); Daryl Lim, I Dissent: The Federal
Circuit’s “Great Dissenter,” Her Influence on the Patent Dialogue, and Why It
Matters, 19 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 873, 873, 911 (2017) [hereinafter Lim, I
Dissent]; Daryl Lim, Judging Equivalents, SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J. 223, 223
(2020) [hereinafter Lim, Judging Equivalents] (reporting on, among other things, the
judge-jury dynamic and the impact of “equitable triggers”).
141
See WESTLAW EDGE, http://www.westlaw.com (search in search bar for “adv:
SY,DI(doctrine /3 equivalent)” with the date range from Jan. 1, 2009 to Dec. 31,
2019). There are other studies that also analyze Westlaw searches on the doctrine of
equivalents. See, e.g., Allison & Lemley, supra note 4, at 963 (“[W]e collected every
district court and court of appeals decision on the doctrine of equivalents that
appeared in Westlaw . . . .”).
142
See Holte & Sichelman, supra note 19, at 137 (describing a similar
verification process with fifteen research assistants).
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(7) the doctrinal limitations employed by the court, such as
prosecution history estoppel;
(8) the limits to prosecution history estoppel, such as
equivalents unforeseen at the time of claim amendment;
(9) the industry at issue;
(10) the level of the court (federal district court or circuit
court);143
(11) the outcome of the case, distinguishing between wins
and losses on both the merits and procedure;
(12) the Federal Circuit judges deciding each opinion;
(13) the judicial circuit in which the district court heard the
case;
(14) whether the opinion identified the parties as being
rivals; and
(15) the outcome of a decision on appeal (where applicable).
Professors Allison and Lemley employed a similar case
content analysis method to study doctrine of equivalents cases
between 1999 and 2005.144 The Allison-Lemley study provides
useful points of comparison for this Article. Their data on win
rates, posture, industry, and other variables allow this Article to
make intertemporal inferences.145 Like the Allison-Lemley study,
this Article reported on all Federal Circuit and district court
opinions.146 At the same time, this Article adds new findings and
analysis in several ways: (1) the dataset includes precedential
and non-precedential cases, as well as Rule 36 cases; (2) it brings
the study up to date, reporting on cases decided between January
1, 2009 and December 31, 2019;147 (3) it includes judgements on a
broader spectrum of procedural postures, eleven procedural
postures from pretrial motions such as motions for summary
judgment to full bench and jury trials, as well as judgment as a

143
The Supreme Court did not decide on any doctrine of equivalents cases
during the relevant period.
144
Allison & Lemley, supra note 4, at 963.
145
See infra Part III.
146
Allison & Lemley, supra note 4, at 957 (“We have conducted an empirical
study of every reported doctrine of equivalents decision in both the Federal Circuit
and the district courts . . . .”).
147
My research assistant identified cases by headings in the opinions. Even
when the analysis did not use a heading, if the opinion discussed the issue, we
included the case in the database so long as there was a specific discussion in the
opinion analyzing the relevant law or facts. Therefore, we excluded opinions with
bare bones recitation of the doctrine.
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matter of law (“JMOL”), up from seven;148 and (4) it makes clear
distinctions between outcomes from the Federal Circuit and
district courts, between wins on procedure and wins on the
merits, and between the tests applied.149
C.

Limitations and Caveats

Like all empirical studies, this one has its limitations and
caveats. The main ones are as follows:
(1) Cases gleaned from legal databases, such as Westlaw, are
known to underreport jury decisions.150 However, given that the
focus is on features of written decisions (including Rule 36
affirmances), the data remains valid as long as it is recognized to
refer to a specific population rather than a sample of all cases in
all possible worlds;
(2) Most cases settle, so decided cases are a nonrandom
subset of all cases;151
(3) The complexity of patent litigation makes it difficult to
generalize, from even a study covering hundreds of cases;152
(4) Parties are not randomly distributed throughout the
judicial districts. Venue selection is a significant feature in
patent litigation.153 Further, some district courts may hear more
cases to amendable to settlement or be filed based on domicile.
District court judges are therefore not assigned a random sample
148

Allison & Lemley, supra note 4, at 980 tbl.1. The additional postures this
Article looks to are: Summary judgment (Both the Patentee and Accused Infringer),
Pleading on Doctrine of Equivalents (Patentee), Declaratory judgment (Accused
Infringer), and Rule 11.
149
For instance, the Allison-Lemley study categorizes the “all elements rule”
together with the “function-way-result” test and the “insubstantial differences” test.
Id. at 964.
150
Id. at 963–64 (“The universe of all decisions is of course different from the
universe of those reported in Westlaw, and in particular our study underreports jury
decisions. But our focus on written decisions (both reported and unreported) allows
us to parse the grounds for decision and the reasoning of the opinions.”).
151
Jay P. Kesan & Gwendolyn G. Ball, How Are Patent Cases Resolved? An
Empirical Examination of the Adjudication and Settlement of Patent Disputes, 84
WASH. U. L. REV. 237, 273–74 (2006) (finding that between 65% and 68% of all
patent cases filed in three particular years were resolved via settlement or a
probable settlement).
152
See Schwartz, supra note 4, at 1188 (“Because patent litigation as a whole is
so complex, it is incredibly complicated to develop and test empirical models.”);
Petherbridge, supra note 1, at 1380 (noting biases inherent in this approach such as
“unobserved reasoning, selection bias, and strategic behavior”); see also Allison &
Lemley, supra note 4, at 966.
153
Kimberly A. Moore, Forum Shopping in Patent Cases: Does Geographic
Choice Affect Innovation?, 79 N.C. L. REV. 889, 924–31 (2001).
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of patent lawsuits, since they are assigned cases from the judicial
district where they sit;154
(5) Circumstances such as a particular judge or jury may
cause a case to settle where the same case before another judge
or jury could proceed to an appeal;155
(6) Content analysis of judicial opinions has well-known
limitations within the methodology itself.156 Statistics fail to
account for extralegal factors influencing judging such as
summary affirmances, the state of the case record on appeal,
judicial deliberations the opinion;157
(7) This Article focuses on how Federal Circuit and lower
courts interpret precedent.
Those interpretations are not
158
uniform and never can be;
(8) Coding by any one person may result in incomplete or
inaccurate coding, despite cross-coding and verification using a
population sample;
(9) This Article does not directly discuss central claiming or
peripheral claiming, both of which rely on the doctrine of
equivalents.159 While doctrinally rich, these types of claiming do
not directly relate to the empirical study;

154

Schwartz, infra note 160, at 241–42.
Eric Herman, Charting the Yays and Nays in Federal Court, CHI. LAW., Mar.
1996, at 10 (“ ‘[I]f [judges] have a really tough case, they can put tremendous
pressure on the parties to settle so there won’t be an appealable order.’ ” (quoting
Judge Richard A. Posner)).
156
See R. Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Is the Federal Circuit Succeeding?
An Empirical Assessment of Judicial Performance, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1105, 1128–29
(2004) (discussing unobserved reasoning, strategic behavior, and selection bias).
157
Harry T. Edwards & Michael A. Livermore, Pitfalls of Empirical Studies
That Attempt to Understand the Factors Affecting Appellate Decisionmaking, 58
DUKE L.J. 1895, 1899 (2009); see also Holte & Sichelman, supra note 19, at 160
(“Data is incomplete and never fully accurate, methodologies can never fully control
for every potential external factor that could explain results.”).
158
See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Does Empirical Evidence on the Civil Justice
System Produce or Resolve Conflict?, 65 DEPAUL L. REV. 635, 636 (2016) (“[E]ven
when the empirical scholars completely agree on the underlying facts, interpretation
of the results can dramatically differ. Empirical legal scholarship is still worth
conducting, but the hope that it will resolve partisan debates in law is unrealistic.”).
159
John F. Duffy, Counterproductive Notice in Literalistic Versus Peripheral
Claiming, 96 B.U. L. REV. 1197, 1203 (2016) (citing Henry E. Smith, Intellectual
Property as Property: Delineating Entitlements in Information, 116 YALE L.J. 1742,
1807 (2007)) (“[M]odern commentators repeatedly make the historical mistake of
asserting that the doctrine of equivalents is a remnant of the central claiming
system. It is not. Both central claiming and peripheral claiming, as traditionally
practiced, rely heavily on the doctrine of equivalents.”).
155
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(10) The reported data is kept to whole numbers without
decimal places, following convention used in other empirical
studies.160 Variables with less than five counts were omitted;
(11) Most cases do not distinguish between amendmentbased estoppel and argument-based estoppel in prosecution
history estoppel cases. Neither does the dataset;161 and
(12) Litigants may consider the expertise and reputation of
the district court judge in deciding whether to appeal,
introducing selection bias effects into the appellate data.162
A statistics post-doctoral fellow from the University of
Chicago conducted a statistical analysis of the data. The Fisher
Exact Test for contingency tables was used to test the null
hypothesis that a case attribute is independent of case
outcome.163 This contingency table approach is more appropriate
than regression because the outcomes and attributes are all
categorical variables; furthermore, a Fisher Exact Test is more
appropriate than a chi-squared test because many of the cells
have expected counts less than five.
Since the outcome of interest and all attributes, except for
“Rival,” have more than two categories, calculating exact pvalues can be computationally difficult, so we calculate Monte

160
See, e.g., Ted Sichelman, Myths of (Un)certainty at the Federal Circuit, 43
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1161, 1175 (2010); Holte & Sichelman, supra note 19, at 158; see
also TJ Cole, Too Many Digits: The Presentation of Numerical Data, 100 ARCHIVES
DISEASE
CHILDHOOD
608,
609
(2015),
https://adc.bmj.com/content/archdischild/100/7/608.full.pdf [https://perma.cc/J2XNZAJD] (“The general principle is to use two or three significant digits for effect sizes,
and one or two significant digits for measures of variability.”). The approach is by no
means universal. Other scholars present their data to one decimal place. See, e.g.,
Allison & Lemley, supra note 4, at 971; David L. Schwartz, Practice Makes Perfect?
An Empirical Study of Claim Construction Reversal Rates in Patent Cases, 107
MICH. L. REV. 223, 249 (2008) (keeping to one decimal place).
161
For a list of cases in the dataset discussing one or both these forms of
estoppel, see generally Pharma Tech Sols. Inc. v. LifeScan, Inc., 942 F.3d 1372 (Fed.
Cir. 2019); Intendis GMBH v. Glenmark Pharm. Inc., USA, 822 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir.
2016); Medtronic Navigation, Inc. v. BrainLAB Medizinische Computersysteme
GmbH, 603 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Pharma Tech Sols. Inc. v. LifeScan Inc., 348 F.
Supp. 3d 1076 (D. Nev. 2018); Alfred E. Mann Found. for Sci. Research v. Cochlear
Corp., 96 F. Supp. 3d 1028 (C.D. Cal. 2015); Paone v. Microsoft Corp., 881 F. Supp.
2d 386 (E.D.N.Y. 2012); LG Elecs. U.S.A., Inc. v. Whirlpool Corp., 798 F. Supp. 2d
541 (D. Del. 2011); Zircon Corp. v. Stanley Works, 713 F. Supp. 2d 881 (N.D. Cal.
2010); MarcTec, LLC v. Johnson & Johnson, 638 F. Supp. 2d 987 (S.D. Ill. 2009).
162
Schwartz, supra note 160, at 243.
163
Daryl Lim, PE Dataset (Jan. 19, 2021) (unpublished dataset) (on file with
author).
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Carlo p-values with 50,000 samples.164 When performing a
hypothesis test, a smaller p-value is indicative of stronger
evidence against the null hypothesis, and typically a p-value
below .05 is considered statistically significant evidence against
the null hypothesis. However, we performed eight hypothesis
tests (one for each attribute), so using a Bonferroni procedure to
control false positives would suggest a cutoff of .05 / 8 =
.00625.165
The number of data points in this instance is naturally
limited by the cases which have been argued and the fact that
the null hypothesis of independence is not rejected for all but the
posture attribute may be due to the small sample size. However,
the descriptive charts nonetheless speak for themselves, and the
data is still informative.
III. THE VITALITY OF THE DOCTRINE OF EQUIVALENTS
Section A presents contemporary, empirical evidence proving
that the Allison-Lemley study’s earlier report of the doctrine of
equivalent’s demise is not true today. Not only are patentees
succeeding twice as much as their predecessors, the doctrine
itself has evolved with the growth of important industrial sectors
such as computers and communications, as well as drugs and
medical inventions, as Section B discusses. Section C reveals the
Federal Circuit judges responsible for shaping the law today and
how they voted. It also debunks the myth that the doctrine of
equivalents is an equitable doctrine and argues that the doctrine
is better characterized as one preventing unfair competition.
Section D completes the portrait of the modern doctrine of
equivalents by presenting data of interest to both academics and
practitioners. It shows how courts applied the doctrinal tests and
their limitations. It also shows the dominant litigation venues
and strategies taken by the litigating parties in those venues.
A.

Revitalization

Fifteen years ago, the Allison-Lemley study declared “[t]he
doctrine of equivalents is for all intents and purposes dead, and
has been for years, even as lawyers and judges were seeing it as

164
G.H. Freeman, & J. H. Halton, Note on an Exact Treatment of Contingency,
Goodness of Fit and Other Problems of Significance. 38 BIOMETRIKA, 141, 141 (1951).
165
E. L. LEHMANN, & J. P. ROMANO, TESTING STATISTICAL HYPOTHESES, 350–51
(3d ed. 2010).

2021]

(UNNOTICED) REVITALIZATION

93

too expansive and struggling to cabin it.”166 They reason that
patentee win rates are not “even close to 50%,” presumably based
on the Priest-Klein hypothesis discussed below.167 The AllisonLemley study concludes that “in the cases litigated to judgment,
patentees overwhelmingly lose doctrine of equivalents cases.”168
In reaching this conclusion, the Allison-Lemley study makes two
observations. First, more than two-thirds of patentee “victories”
involved “defeating an accused infringer’s motion for summary
judgment.”169 This, they dismiss as “hardly the same as actually
winning the case on equivalents grounds.”170 Second, they note
that less than 10% of cases involved patentees “actually winning
the case on equivalents grounds.”171
To examine the vitality of the doctrine between 2009–2019,
this Article similarly distinguishes between procedural and
substantive wins. Patentee win rates on the merits are 21%
(district courts) and 22% (Federal Circuit). Patentee win rates on
procedural issues are 14% (district courts) and 8% (Federal
Circuit). The doubling of patentee win rates on the merits at
both district courts and the Federal Circuit is remarkable in and
of itself. What is also interesting is that while patentee wins on
the merits have risen, patentee win rates on procedural issues
have fallen sharply from “two-thirds” observed in the AllisonLemley study to between 8% to 14%.
Equally striking is the observation when these results are
placed in the context of doctrine of equivalents data over a fortyyear period. Professor Crouch charted case outcomes at the

166

Allison & Lemley, supra note 4, at 967.
Id. Patentees won 24% of reported cases, which the Allison-Lemley study
concluded was “remarkably small” when “[c]ompared to the overall patentee win
rates on other issues—54% on validity alone in cases at various stages of litigation,
and 58% overall in cases that make it to trial.” Id. at 966. The Priest-Klein
hypothesis places plaintiff win rate at 50% which is consistent with the general
figure the Allison-Lemley study reports. See infra note 176 and accompanying text.
A study by Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP on 2017/2018 Federal Circuit appeals
reports similar overall patentee win rate of 55%. GIBSON DUNN, FEDERAL CIRCUIT
YEAR IN REVIEW 2017/2018, 5–6 (2018) [hereinafter GIBSON DUNN 2017/2018],
https://www.gibsondunn.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Federal-Circuit-20172018-Year-in-Review.pdf [https://perma.cc/7NRM-R66W].
168
Allison & Lemley, supra note 4, at 967
169
Id.
170
Id.
171
Id.
167
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Federal Circuit in a November 2019 blog post.172 The chart
reveals an inverted U-shape (see Figure 1 below). This suggests
that past may be prologue and that the decline that the AllisonLemley study, as well its contemporaries, observed represents a
snapshot of the doctrine on its wane. But that snapshot fails to
recognize both its earlier vitality and the possibility for that
revitalization to occur, as it most certainly has.

Figure 1: Patentee Wins Over Time173
Figures 2 and 3 show that the discrepancy over time of
patentees’ wins over accused infringers was much more
consistent at the Federal Circuit than at the district court level.
This result may simply be a function of having many more of the
same judges hearing those cases at the Federal Circuit.

172
Dennis Crouch, Doctrine of Equivalents at the Federal Circuit, PATENTLY-O,
(Nov.
22,
2019),
https://patentlyo.com/patent/2019/11/doctrine-equivalentsfederal.html [https://perma.cc/MLB9-7CBV].
173
Id.
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Figure 2: Overall Wins over Time (District Court)

Figure 3: Overall Wins over Time (Federal Circuit)
Conventional wisdom states that patentees are less
successful invoking the doctrine after Markman hearings became
important.174 Whether the doctrine is “dead” is a normative

174

See Allison & Lemley, supra note 4, at 977–98.
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question whose parameters are debatable. However, using the
metrices in the Allison-Lemley study as a baseline, it is clear that
the doctrine has been revived in recent years.
Cases in which the parties were rivals dominated wins
(56%). When parties were rivals, courts found for patentees on
the merits between 23% (district courts) and 29% (Federal
Circuit) of the time, and when parties were not rivals, district
courts found for patentees 15% (Federal Circuit) to 18% (district
courts) of the time. The higher patentee win rate when the
alleged infringer was a rival suggests that judges continue to
adhere to the Supreme Court’s exhortation to safeguard
patentees against unfair competition.175
It is worth noting Priest and Klein posited cases that
obviously favor one party over the other will settle and those that
make it to judgment will be close, resulting in a 50% win rate.176
Most cases are not obvious.177 Moreover, an “overall” win rate—
which can mean either including pre-trial outcomes or district
court decisions consolidated with non-redundant appellate
decisions—are between 25% to 36% and therefore inconsistent
with Priest-Klein.178 Commenters have also disputed the validity
of the hypothesis in patent cases.179 Technological quirks and the
nature of the parties result in fact-specifics outcomes.180 Multiple
patent law doctrines may be interrelated and changes in one may

175
See Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 607–08
(1950) (“The doctrine of equivalents evolved in response to this experience.”).
176
George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation,
13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 19–20 (1984).
177
Jason Rantanen, Why Priest-Klein Cannot Apply to Individual Issues in
Patent Cases, U. IOWA LEGAL STUD. RES. PAPER NO. 12-15, Mar. 25, 2013 at 1,
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2132810 (“At best, the PriestKlein hypothesis only applies to the selection of disputes, not the selection of
individual issues. Due to the presence of multiple issues in patent cases, there is
axiomatically no basis for inferring that a patentee would expect a fifty-percent
chance of winning on each one.”).
178
See Chris Barry et al., 2017 Patent Litigation Study: Change on the Horizon?,
PWC 15 (May 2017) (reporting on district court sample including trial and pre-trial
outcomes)
https://www.pwc.com/us/en/forensic-services/publications/assets/2017patent-litigation-study.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y8P6-9Y43].
179
See Mark A. Lemley & Colleen V. Chien, Are the U.S. Patent Priority Rules
Really Necessary?, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 1299, 1310–12 (2003) (arguing that the PriestKlein hypothesis is not borne out by the data in patent cases).
180
Schwartz, supra note 4, at 1187 (“For example, patent litigation between
branded and generic drug manufacturers differs from patent litigation over a
business method patent held by a non-practicing entity.”).
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affect another.181 As Professors Holte and Sichelman noted,
“changes in litigation budgets, attorney quality, and other
unobservable factors” may have changed the behavior of parties,
“rather than judicial decisionmaking.”182 Finally, the percentage
of patentee wins must be regarded with some caution in
concluding whether it is important or not. For example, in
employment discrimination litigation, the plaintiff win rate is
33%.183 However, the literature endorses the importance of
employment discrimination training to avoid litigation.184 One
reason may be because the stakes are so asymmetric.
B.

Evolution

The Allison-Lemley study reported mechanical devices made
up 61.7% of the cases between 1999 and 2004, while
pharmaceutical inventions made up a mere 6.5%.185 Industries
innovate differently, obtain patents differently, and exploit the
patents in different ways.186 This Article relied on the six
National Bureau of Economic Research (“NBER”) technology
classifications to examine whether there were industry-specific
differences in doctrine of equivalents cases.187 Intertemporal

181
Id. at 1188 (“Changes in precedent can alter lawyers’ behavior in drafting
patents. Furthermore, changes in precedent can also influence party behavior in
litigation.”).
182
Holte & Sichelman, supra note 19, at 161.
183
Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, How Employment Discrimination
Plaintiffs Fare in Federal Court, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 429, 439 n.13 (2004).
184
See generally Todd J. Maurer & Nancy E. Rafuse, Learning, Not Litigating:
Managing Employee Development and Avoiding Claims of Age Discrimination, 15
ACAD. MGT. PERSPS. 110 (2001).
185
Allison & Lemley, supra note 4, at 972–73. The Allison-Lemley study used a
slightly different classifications than this Article and reported the following results:
mechanical devices (61.7%), software (22.0%), electronics (19.6%), pharmaceuticals
(6.5%), and biotechnology (2.7%).
186
Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV.
1575, 1581–95 (2003).
187
Bronwyn H. Hall, Adam B. Jaffe & Manuel Trajtenberg, The NBER U.S.
Patent Citations Data File: Lessons, Insights and Methodological Tools 3 (NBER,
Working Paper No. 8498, 2001), http://www.nber.org/patents (describing six
technologies: chemistry, computers and communications, drugs and medical,
electrical and electronic, mechanical, and other). The NBER classifications “are
regularly used in empirical patent law scholarship, and are a useful way to
distinguish outcomes and reasoning by technology type.” Holte & Sichelman, supra
note 19, at 138. For other studies employing the NBER methodology, see, e.g.,
Michael Risch, A Generation of Patent Litigation, 52 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 67, 84–85
(2015); Christopher A. Cotropia, Jay P. Kesan & David L. Schwartz, Unpacking
Patent Assertion Entities (PAEs), 99 MINN. L. REV. 649, 680 (2014).
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studies like these are particularly useful in revealing how
industries may change over time. Here, the results are nothing
short of dramatic.
From 2009 to 2019, computer and communications
inventions dominated the dataset (32%), and these, together with
drug and medical inventions (23%), make up over half of reported
cases. In contrast, 22% of cases involve mechanical devices, or
less than a third from just a decade or so ago. Figure 4 shows
this trend, with mechanical inventions dropping off sharply from
2010 and never recovering. A recent report on Federal Circuit
cases by Gibson Dunn supports this Article’s calculations.188
Most Federal Circuit cases from 2018 and 2019 involved
Software/Electrical (39%), Chemical/Pharmaceutical (24%), or
Biotech/Medical Device (10%) cases, with Mechanical comprising
21% of cases, and Business Method comprising 6%.189

Figure 4: Industries over Time

188
GIBSON DUNN, FEDERAL CIRCUIT YEAR IN REVIEW 2018/2019, 6 (2019)
[hereinafter
GIBSON
DUNN
2018/2019],
https://www.gibsondunn.com/wpcontent/uploads/2019/12/Federal-Circuit-2018-2019-Year-in-Review.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5RVF-X9XN]. See also GIBSON DUNN 2017/2018, supra note 167, at 3.
189
See GIBSON DUNN 2018/2019, supra note 188, at 6. Similar percentages were
reported in 2017/2018. See GIBSON DUNN 2017/2018, supra note 167, at 3.
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The Holte-Sichelman study on nonobviousness, which also
involves a similarly amorphous patent law standard, also notes a
more significant rise in computers and communications patents,
as well as in drugs and medical patents compared to mechanical
patents.190 The authors note that “it could very well be that the
shift in the district courts and Federal Circuit toward findings of
obviousness was merely driven by the changing nature of the
technologies under consideration.”191
Commentators predicted that the doctrine of equivalents
would play a more important role in the information technology
industries due to the rapid pace of product change and uncertain
scope of product claims in those industries.192 The contours of
mechanical patents may have been settled by a much longer
historical runway of litigation, whereas the computer and
communications industries, as well as drug and medical
inventions, comprise the pillars of modern economy in the form of
smartphones, the Internet of Things, personalized medicine, and
biologics.
The 2011–2015 period where computer and
communications inventions peaked in frequency mirrors the
period of patent litigation in smartphone technology.193 While a
closer look is needed to ascertain a causal relationship, it is
possible that patentees employed the doctrine in their pursuit of
infringers during that period.
Commentators have also questioned more generally whether
the doctrine of equivalents can apply meaningfully to “rapidly
evolving technologies,”194 including biologics,195 biomedical,196 and

190

Holte & Sichelman, supra note 19, at 149.
Id.
192
See Julie E. Cohen & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Scope and Innovation in the
Software Industry, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 45–47 (2001).
193
Charles Duhigg & Steve Lohr, The Patent, Used as a Sword, N.Y. TIMES (Oct.
7, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/08/technology/patent-wars-among-techgiants-can-stifle-competition.html; Jack Nicas, Apple and Samsung End
Smartphone
Patent
Wars,
N.Y.
TIMES
(June
27,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/27/technology/apple-samsung-smartphonepatent.html.
194
William S. Galliani, Patent Infringement Amidst Rapidly Evolving
Technologies: New Equivalents, the Doctrine of Equivalents and the Reverse Doctrine
of Equivalents, 6 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 75, 78, 87–89 (1990).
Cf. Burk & Lemley, supra note 186, at 1658 (describing how the reverse doctrine of
equivalents “can apply to radical improvements in any area of technology, and it has
indeed been used to cover technological paradigm shifts within an industry.”).
195
D. Alan White, The Doctrine of Equivalents: Fairness and Uncertainty in an
Era of Biologic Pharmaceuticals, 60 EMORY L.J. 751, 769 (2011) (“[I]n cases
191
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nanotechnology.197 The results in this Article indicate that courts
are quite willing to employ the doctrine of equivalents to these
industries.
The results show that courts used the “function-way-result”
test in 20% of mechanical cases, trailing behind both computer
and communications (32%) and drug and medical devices (25%)
cases. One reason may be that mechanical patents are relatively
simpler and can be adjudicated and disposed of using literal
infringement analysis. As a result, fewer patentees may choose
to assert mechanical patents under the doctrine of equivalents.
That is an empirical question that could be the subject of a future
study.
At the district court, patentees did best in electronics cases
(35%), while at the Federal Circuit, they did best in drug and
medical cases (36%). In contrast, the Allison-Lemley study found
no industry-specific differences in outcomes, with the range
falling between 22.2% and 29.0%, “a remarkably narrow range
that closely brackets the overall patentee win rates.”198 The
numbers suggest that patentees’ attorneys may be doing a good
job advising their clients to focus on industries where courts
seem to be more willing to find for patentees, and to avoid
litigating in those areas where courts take a less charitable view
of infringement assertions. In doing so, they have kept their
margin of wins while reducing exposure in industries where
doctrine of equivalents assertions will unlikely stick.
C.

Hostility & Endorsement at the Federal Circuit

In 1982, to introduce uniformity and certainty into patent
law, Congress established the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit as the forum for patent appeals.199 Chief Judge
Prost (10%), together with Judge Lourie (9%), and Judge Reyna
(8%) decided over one in four cases on appeal (27%). Based on
frequency alone, these three judges may have been most

involving the doctrine of equivalents, ultimate questions of fact are often decided by
juries that are poorly equipped to deal with complex scientific issues.”).
196
Faith S. Fillman, Doctrine of Equivalents: Is Festo the Right Decision for the
Biomedical Industry?, 33 ST. MARY’S L.J. 493, 513–14 (2002).
197
Andrew Wasson, Protecting the Next Small Thing: Nanotechnology and the
Reverse Doctrine of Equivalents, DUKE L. & TECH. REV. ¶ 6 (2004).
198
Allison & Lemley, supra note 4, at 973.
199
Lim, I Dissent, supra note 140, at 950.
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influential among Federal Circuit judges in shaping our
contemporary understanding of the doctrine of equivalents.
On the merits, the judges who decided most often in favor of
patentees were: Judge Linn (75%), Judge Taranto (50%), Judge
Moore (36%), and Judge Rader (32%). Judge Stoll (100%), Judge
Hughes (100%), Judge O’Malley (87%), Judge Bryson (81%), and
Judge Lourie (80%) decided most often in favor of alleged
infringers. The Allison-Lemley study indicates that by the late
1990s, patentees almost never prevailed at trial or on appeal.200
The foregoing discussion, as well as Figure 5, shows that if a
patentee failing was ever an accurate conclusion, it is no longer
true. Figure 5 shows that almost every judge found for patentees
between 2009 and 2019.

Figure 5: Federal Circuit Judges by Outcome
Judge Lourie’s hostility toward the doctrine was also evident
anecdotally through his opinions. In the 2019 case of Amgen Inc.
v. Sandoz Inc., Judge Lourie wrote that “[t]he doctrine of
equivalents applies only in exceptional cases and is not ‘simply
the second prong of every infringement charge, regularly
available to extend protection beyond the scope of the claims.’ ”201

200

Allison & Lemley, supra note 4, at 970–71.
Amgen Inc. v. Sandoz Inc., 923 F.3d 1023, 1029 (Fed. Cir.), reh’g granted, 776
F. App’x 707 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (emphasis added) (quoting London v. Carson Pirie
Scott & Co., 946 F.2d 1534, 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1991)) (citing Duncan Parking Techs.,
201
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Professor Crouch criticized this attempt to cabin the
doctrine, writing that “the court’s limit of the [doctrine of
equivalents] to ‘exceptional cases’ seems to be a major step
without precedential backing.”202 Amgen cited Professor Crouch’s
post in its petition for rehearing en banc.203 The Court responded
by altering its opinion to remove what, according to Professor
Crouch was, “the most offensive portion of its decision,” who
explained that:
The decision as it reads now recognizes that [doctrine of
equivalents] winners will be rare—and that rarity stems from
the nature of the [doctrine of equivalents] test. In particular,
[the doctrine of equivalents] only applies when the accused
device or method is different from what is claimed but may not
be “substantially different” on an element-by-element basis.204

This Article examines 96 Federal Circuit cases, just under a
third of the 351 cases reported in the dataset. Overall, the
Federal Circuit found for patentees in 22% of the cases, higher
than the overall figure during the 1999–2004 period in the
Allison-Lemley study (16.8%).205 The Federal Circuit affirmed a
supermajority of district court decisions (82%), reflecting a
confidence in the lower courts’ judgment not found in other
instances (Figure 6, below). For instance, the overall affirmance
rate at the Federal Circuit between August 1, 2017 and July 31,
2018 stood at 70% for infringement cases.206

Inc. v. IPS Grp., Inc., 914 F.3d 1347, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“[T]he doctrine of
equivalents cannot be used to effectively read out a claim limitation . . . because the
public has a right to rely on the language of patent claims.”)).
202
Dennis Crouch, Federal Circuit: “The Doctrine of Equivalents Applies ONLY
in
Exceptional
Cases,”
PATENTLY-O
(May
8,
2019),
https://patentlyo.com/patent/2019/05/doctrine-equivalents-exceptional.html
[https://perma.cc/C4DE-V9WE]; see also Crouch, “Exceptional Case”, supra note 8
(“The decision was so problematic though because ‘exceptional case’ is a term of art
used elsewhere in patent law and suggests creation of an additional test prior to
allowing a patentee to rely upon [doctrine of equivalents].”).
203
Amgen’s Petition for Rehearing En Banc at 9, Amgen Inc. v. Sandoz Inc., 923
F.3d 1023 (Fed. Cir.) (No. 18-1551), reh’g granted, 776 F. App’x 707 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
204
See Crouch, “Exceptional Case”, supra note 8.
205
Allison & Lemley, supra note 4, at 970.
206
GIBSON DUNN 2017/2018, supra note 167, at 8. But see GIBSON DUNN
2018/2019, supra note 188, at 13 (reporting a Federal Circuit affirmance rate of 55%
percent between August 1, 2018 and July 31, 2019).
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Figure 6: Appeal Outcome
While it is reasonably clear that the doctrine seeks to ensure
patentees get fair protection in their claims, there is less
consensus on what extent “equitable” principles animate the
doctrine.207 The Supreme Court has justified the doctrine as an
equitable safeguard against “piracy,” “stealing,” and “fraud.”208
Over the years, some, including judges at the Federal Circuit,
believe the doctrine of equivalents is “designed to do equity,”209 or
that “its roots firmly in equity, and to acknowledge that when
and in what circumstances it applies is a question of equitable

207

Moorhead, supra note 79, at 1428 (noting that “the doctrine of equivalents is
an equitable doctrine”). But see Reavill, supra note 15, at 320 (“Recent debate,
however, has questioned the way in which the doctrine approaches the principles of
equity.”). See also Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512,
1540 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (Plager, J., dissenting) (“[W]hen there is a wrong for which
there is no adequate remedy at law, equity courts have traditionally gone beyond the
law to impose a just and equitable result. Thus in those special cases in which the
competitor’s product is literally different but the difference is so insubstantial as to
constitute a ‘fraud on the patent,’ a court in the exercise of its extraordinary equity
power may extend the remedy of infringement in order to protect the rights of the
patentee granted by law.”), rev’d, 520 U.S. 17 (1997); id. at 1549 (Lourie, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that the doctrine’s weighing various factors is an equitable
determination for a judge).
208
Graver Tank & Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 607–08
(1950).
209
Perkin-Elmer Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 822 F.2d 1528, 1532 (Fed.
Cir. 1987).
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law, a question for which judges bear responsibility.”210
Commentators have blamed the doctrine’s unruly scope on its
equitable roots.211 Therefore, one might think that the doctrine of
equivalents is an equitable doctrine like the contract law doctrine
of promissory estoppel, spun from the same cloth.212 If so, we
would be mistaken.
The cases emphasize fair play rather equity in the legal
sense. With cases involving equity, judges have been empowered
to intervene when the strict legal result causes injustice—as is
the case in the true “equitable” sense.213 Patentees may “in all
cases invoke to some extent the doctrine of equivalents,”214
without a “judicial exploration of the equities of a case,”215
beforehand, so they may invoke the doctrine whether or not they
succeed in showing merit in an equitable sense.
In contrast, courts have no discretion to remedy a seemingly
unjust result by invoking it themselves,216 and cannot embark on
a “judicial exploration of the equities of a case before allowing
application of the doctrine of equivalents.”217 Indeed, judges

210

Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co. (Festo I), 234 F.3d
558, 593 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (Plager, J., concurring), vacated, 535 U.S. 722 (2002), and
aff’d, 493 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
211
See, e.g., Gregory J. Smith, The Federal Circuit’s Modern Doctrine of
Equivalents in Patent Infringement, 29 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 901, 912 n.64 (1989)
(“[C]ourts have justified the lack of usable guidelines for applying the doctrine by
stating that it is an equitable doctrine, and to constrain it with rigid rules of
application would compromise the court’s equitable powers.”); Reavill, supra note 15,
at 358 (“Without intent, the doctrine of equivalents is no more than a second stab at
proving infringement for the patentee, and the doctrine loses both its equitable
nature and its justification.”).
212
See, e.g., Jay M. Feinman, Promissory Estoppel and Judicial Method, 97
HARV. L. REV. 678, 680 n.18 (1984).
213
Hilton Davis Chem. Co, v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1521 (Fed.
Cir. 1995) (“[I]n doctrine of equivalents cases, this court’s allusions to equity invoke
equity in its broadest sense—equity as general fairness.”), rev’d, 520 U.S. 17 (1997);
see Timothy R. Holbrook, Equivalency and Patent Law’s Possession Paradox, 23
HARV. J. L. & TECH. 1, 5 (2009) (“The express purpose of [the doctrine of equivalents]
is to ensure fair and adequate protection to the patentee and to solidify the patent
incentive.”).
214
Seymour v. Osborne, 78 U.S. 516, 556 (1870).
215
Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 34 (1997).
216
Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1521 (“By referring to the doctrine as a doctrine of
fairness, neither the Supreme Court nor this court has invoked the myriad
implications of an alternative to legal remedies. In addition, neither the Supreme
Court nor this court has invoked equity in the technical sense of a set of principles
originating in England to compensate for the historically harsh rules of common
law.”).
217
Warner-Jenkinson Co., 520 U.S. at 34.
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never employed the doctrine independently of juries.218 Most
cases neither mention equity, nor did equity have discernable
impact.219
What might be better termed “fairness” rather than “equity”
in the legal sense usually manifested when parties were rivals
and when the case involved allegations of copying.220 This is
consistent with the Supreme Court’s intention that the doctrine
protects patentees from “piracy,” “fraud,” and “stealing.”221
Evidence of copying suggested that the differences were
“insubstantial.”222
At the same time, the doctrine tolerates copying as an
intermediate step to designing around the patent.223
Leapfrogging advances the state-of-the-art and fuels the dynamic
competition that characterizes a working patent system.
Accordingly, courts treat these as exculpatory factors when
looking into the substantiality of differences under the doctrine of
equivalents.224 A defendant seeking this justification must show
its device does more than just narrowly escape the claim.225

218

Id. Winans itself was an appeal from a jury finding on the infringement issue
and cannot be an equitable doctrine. Winans v. Denmead, 56 U.S. 330, 330 (1853)
(“The jury, under the instruction of the District Judge, the late Judge Glenn, then
sitting alone, found a verdict for the defendants; and the plaintiff brought the case to
this court by a writ of error.”).
219
See Lim, Judging Equivalents, supra note 140, at 260 (reporting that the
equitable nature of the case as such did not dominate the outcome of cases in the
dataset. Most cases—about 73%—“did not mention equity in any form . . . . Of the
cases that did, those that found for patentees and defendants were about evenly
split . . . .”).
220
Id. at 263, 265 (reporting that copying has not been prominent, comprising
8% of all cases. Patentees won 64% of cases involving copying). Rivalry plays an
important role in copying cases, with patentees twice as likely to win against a rival
than against a non-rival. Id. Patentees succeeded 60% in cases where they alleged
copying, compared with defendants alleging design-around/independent inventions
(40%). Id.
221
Graver Tank & Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 612
(1950) (Black, J., dissenting).
222
Hilton Davis Chemical Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1519
(Fed. Cir. 1995), rev’d 520 U.S. 17 (1997).
223
Id. at 1520.
224
Id. at 1532–33 (Newman, J., concurring) (“If minor improvements are likely
to be captured by the doctrine of equivalents, this might cause the would-be
competitor to move to diverging areas instead of simply tagging along at the
periphery of the patentee’s claims. On this theory the doctrine . . . could encourage
‘leapfrogging’ advances as opposed to minor improvements and substantial
imitation.”).
225
See Paul N. Katz, The Doctrine of Equivalents and Its Impact on “Designing
Around”, 4 FED. CIR. B.J. 315, 316, 320–21 (1994).
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Moreover, defendants who were not rivals of the patentees-insuit were more likely to prevail than if the parties were rivals in
cases involving claims of design-arounds and independent
invention.226
The arc of history suggests that the doctrine of equivalents
continues to lack a coherent vision. In 1994, patent attorney
Rudolph Hofmann lamented how “[t]he patent community
continues to struggle to develop an analysis that is both equitable
and predictable.”227 In 2000, then-Federal Circuit Chief Judge
Michel called the doctrine “the most difficult and least
predictable of all doctrines in patent law to apply”228 and
admitted that the court’s decisions did not increase the
predictability of outcomes of disputes “litigated to conclusion
through appeal.”229 Two years later, Federal Circuit Judge Rader
confessed that “[f]ew problems have vexed this court more than
articulating
discernible
standards
for
non-textual
230
In 2007, Professors Allison and Lemley
infringement.”
observed that case law on the doctrine was in disarray, with
courts “analyz[ing] the facts on a completely ad hoc basis.”231
These comments are legitimate insofar as they reflect a
sincere view that all is not as it should be with the doctrine of
equivalents. At the same time, however, the pessimism should
also be seen in perspective. Patent law features a host of
complex issues, including lost profits, written description, and
the doctrine of equivalents. Professor Sichelman found that
direct infringement and doctrine of equivalents cases both had a
reversal rate of 15% based on a study of Federal Circuit cases
226
Lim, Judging Equivalents, supra note 140, at 265–66 (“[T]he accused
infringer, who was not a rival, was significantly more likely to prevail against a
patentee than if the parties were rivals (75.0% versus 54.5%). This is consistent with
the view that the doctrine’s purpose is to protect the patentee from copyists, and not
innovators.”).
227
Rudolph P. Hofmann, Jr., The Doctrine of Equivalents: Twelve Years of
Federal Circuit Precedent Still Leaves Practitioners Wondering, 20 WM. MITCHELL L.
REV. 1033, 1034 (1994); Moorhead, supra note 79, at 1428–29 (“This difficulty is
enhanced by the fact that even the members of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit cannot agree on its application.”).
228
Paul R. Michel, The Role and Responsibility of Patent Attorneys in Improving
the Doctrine of Equivalents, 40 IDEA: J.L. & TECH. 123, 123 (2000).
229
Id. at 124 (“Today, as far as equivalent infringement goes, patent lawyers
cannot with certainty predict dispute outcomes under the doctrine of equivalents.”).
230
Johnson & Johnston Assocs., Inc. v. R.E. Serv. Co., Inc., 285 F.3d 1046, 1056
(2002) (Rader, J., concurring).
231
Allison & Lemley, supra note 4, at 228 (alteration in original) (quoting
Glitzenstein, supra note 13, at 309).
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between 2000–2007.232 In contrast, as shown in Figure 7, “the
reversal rate on section 102(a) prior art issues was 41 percent for
appealing patentees and 31 percent for appealing accused
infringers.”233 In so far as reversal rates are an indicator of
malignancy, the doctrine seems relatively benign.

Figure 7: Reversal Rates by Issue at the Federal Circuit (2000 2007)234
D. Theory and Practice
1.

Doctrinal Tests

Is the “function-way-result” test the test courts most
commonly apply in practice as concluded in the Allison-Lemley
study?235 Courts employed the “function-way-result” test about a
third of the time (36%) between 2009–2019, an almost identical
result compared with the Allison-Lemley study (36.5%) between
1999–2004.236 Patentees prevailed between 22% (district court)

232

Sichelman, supra note 160, at 1179 .
Id. at 1178.
234
Id. at 1175.
235
See Allison & Lemley, supra note 4, at 959 (“The most commonly applied test,
which fits mechanical inventions particularly well but which is also applied to other
kinds of subject matter, is the ‘function-way-result’ test.”).
236
Id. at 980.
233
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to 17% (Federal Circuit) of the time between 2009–2019, much
lower in their win rate under the Allison-Lemley study (33.5%)
between 1999–2004.237 Under the “insubstantial differences”
test, patentees prevailed between 15% (district court) to 25%
(Federal Circuit) of the time, dramatically lower than
counterparts studied by Allison-Lemley, where patentees won
under the “insubstantial differences” test in 29.5% of cases.238
As illustrated in Part III, this Article observed more cases
related to chemical inventions, which conventional wisdom links
to the “insubstantial differences” test, than cases related to
mechanical inventions, which conventional wisdom links to the
We should expect more cases
“function-way-result” test.239
employing the “insubstantial differences” test, not less. This
indicates courts are finding the “function-way-result” test to be
adequate.
Courts applied both tests 21% of the time between 2009–
2019, also lower than under the Allison-Lemley study, which
found courts applying more than one test 30.5% of the time.240
When courts applied both tests between 2009–2019, patentees
prevailed between 24% (district court) to 36% (Federal Circuit) of
the time. Figure 8 below shows that use of the “function-wayresult” test declined precipitously between 2009 and 2011, never
recovering. This is due in part to the declining number of cases
from 2011 onward. The Allison-Lemley study had no comparable
data.

237

Id. at 975.
Id. at 967.
239
Courts and commentators have criticized the “function-way-result” as being
inadequate for chemical compounds because it focuses on function even though the
invention is defined by its structure, and different structures can perform the same
function in the same way to achieve the same result. See Warner-Jenkinson Co. v.
Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 39–40 (1997) (“[W]hile the [‘function-wayresult’] test may be suitable for analyzing mechanical devices, it often provides a
poor framework for analyzing other products or processes.”); see also Mylan Instl.
LLC v. Aurobindo Pharma Ltd., 857 F.3d 858, 869 (Fed. Cir. 2017). (“[T]he
substantial differences test may be more suitable than [the function-way-result test]
for determining equivalence in the chemical arts.”).
240
Allison & Lemley, supra note 4, at 974–75.
238
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Figure 8: Doctrine of Equivalents (“DOE”) Test over Time
2.

Judicial Limits

As a question of law, limitations to the doctrine of
equivalents enable judges to enter summary judgments of noninfringement in favor of defendants, protecting them from
“baseless patent infringement claims.”241 Most cases (45%) did
not discuss one of the four bars to the doctrine of equivalents.
How did courts apply prosecution history estoppel, deemed by
commentators as “the one that has created the most
controversy”?242
Prosecution history estoppel was most frequently raised by
accused infringers (27%), followed in turn by the “all-elements”
rule (18%), and then distantly by the public dedication rule (5%)
and the prior art bar (4%). At the district court level, the
dominance of prosecution history estoppel and the “all-elements”
rule tracks the success accused infringers enjoy in defeating
patentee’s infringement claims.
Accused infringers prevailed in a whopping 71% of cases
under the “all-elements” rule, followed closely by prosecution
history estoppel (69%), with the public dedication bar (56%) and
the prior art rule (50%) trailing behind. This striking map of the
limits accused infringers raised against their relative success

241
242

Meurer & Nard, supra note 4, at 1999.
Allison & Lemley, supra note 4, at 960.
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rates suggests that patent attorneys are attuned to the most
effective arguments in advising their clients, and courts validate
the judgment of those attorneys in turn. Results at the Federal
Circuit level track those at the district court.243
One reason for the relatively poor showing by accused
infringers using the public dedication and prior art rules is that
patent applicants must navigate prior art arguments as a matter
of course and patentees are consequently more skilled at
prevailing against alleged infringers who argue that a limit to
the doctrine should apply. The Allison-Lemley study offers an
interesting insight on the relatively good win rates for patentees.
It surmised that “[t]his is probably because the all elements rule
is intended as a limiting doctrine, and a court is likely to invoke
it (or the related ‘vitiating an element’ approach) only where the
patentee is arguing for an interpretation that would effectively
eliminate an element of the patent claim.”244
The Allison-Lemley study focused on patentee rather than
infringer wins.245 A table with a side-by-side comparison reveals
results to be consistent across 1999–2019 at the Federal Circuit
level with respect to prosecution history estoppel and the “allelements” rule. No conclusion can be drawn with respect to the
prior art bar since the Allison-Lemley study omitted it.
Similarly, with only one win reported at the Federal Circuit level
out of eight cases involving the public dedication rule, the more
prudent course is to discount that result rather than draw firm
conclusions on the 13% figure reported below.

243

At the Federal Circuit, accused infringers’ win rates are as follows: “all
elements” rule (67%), prosecution history estoppel (67%), public dedication rule
(50%), and prior art bar (33%).
244
Allison & Lemley, supra note 4, at 975.
245
Id. at 968–69.
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1999 – 2004

2009 – 2019

(Patentee Wins,
Federal Circuit)

(Patentee Wins,
Federal Circuit)

Prosecution History
Estoppel

26.9%

25%

“All-Elements” Rule

23.5%

25%

Prior Art Bar

Not reported

33%

Public Dedication
Rule

0.0%

13%

This Article also reports on the three exceptions to
prosecution history estoppel: unforeseeability, tangentiality, and
“some other reason.” Patentees bear the burden of showing that
one or more of these exceptions apply to defeat prosecution
history estoppel and prevail.246 At the district court level, their
success rates were as follows: unforeseeability (20%),
tangentiality (18%), and “some other reason” (0%). At the
Federal Circuit level, the results were better: unforeseeability
(50%), tangentiality (60%), and “some other reason” (0%).
Given that patentees routinely amend claims to avoid prior
art during prosecution, it is unsurprising that tangentiality—a
rebuttal mapped to precisely that activity—should feature
prominently.
However, the prominence of foreseeability is
surprising. Equivalents are “foreseeable” even if one of ordinary
skill in the art would not recognize that it was an equivalent or
view it as acceptable for use in the invention at the time the
application is filed so long as the variant existed at the time of
the application.247 This requires patentees to “reach beyond
conventional knowledge when filing an application or
246
Festo II, 535 U.S. 722, 740–41 (2002), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 988 (2004), and
aff’d, 493 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
247
Holbrook, supra note 213, at 23 (“The Federal Circuit has since made
foreseeability an even more stringent standard, rendering rebuttal of the Festo
presumption effectively impossible unless the asserted equivalent is solely the result
of later-developed technology.”).

112

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 95:65

amendment to anticipate all potential uses of extant technologies
that may be relevant to the claimed invention.”248 The problem,
as Federal Circuit Judge Newman argued, is that patentees may
not fully appreciate existing technology until a later date.249
Foreseeability is an uphill battle, so to see patentees succeeding
comparably well with tangentiality suggests that further study
should be done to investigate how patentees made those
arguments and why they succeeded. No other empirical study in
the literature has reported on these results, so there is no basis
for intemporal comparison.
3.

Venue and Posture

The choice of venue is central to the strategy of litigating
parties. Patentees select their venues as best as they can in
hopes that their choice would buttress the chances of a favorable
outcome, or hedge against an unfavorable one.250 Earlier studies
concluded that a statistically significant difference existed
between districts for other important issues in patent
litigation.251 This Article sought to determine which venues
formed the principal battlegrounds for parties in doctrine of
equivalents cases and whether that influenced the outcomes.
Which regional circuit courts and appellate judges have been
most influential in shaping our understanding of the doctrine of
equivalents and which side do they tend to favor?252 The dataset
revealed that cases from the Third Circuit (28%), Seventh Circuit
(13%), and Ninth Circuit (18%) dominated. No other circuits
came close. As is apparent from Figure 9 below, the Third
Circuit’s dominance was largely unchallenged throughout the
entire eleven-year sweep of the dataset. This was likely due to
its popularity as the seat of incorporation for many companies.

248

Id. at 24.
Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co. (Festo IV), 493 F.3d
1368, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (Newman, J., dissenting).
250
Christopher B. Seaman, Willful Patent Infringement and Enhanced Damages
After In Re Seagate: An Empirical Study, 97 IOWA L. REV. 417, 449 (2012)
(“Patentees frequently engage in forum shopping by filing suit in districts that are
perceived as favorable.”). But see TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Grp. Brands
LLC, 137 S. Ct. 1514, 1516 (2017) (holding that venue depends on the defendant’s
“regular and established place of business,” which is its state of incorporation).
251
Moore, supra note 153, at 919 tbl.10 (finding significant variation between
districts on findings of infringement and validity).
252
See supra Section III.C.
249
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Specifically, “65% of Fortune 500 companies and over half of all
U.S. publicly traded companies are incorporated in Delaware.”253
While the Ninth Circuit originally shared the Third Circuit’s
dominance, its dominance fell precipitously from 2012 onward,
never quite recovering.
To understand a reason for this
development, it is useful to look at Figure 10, which shows the
distribution of cases by industry over time. Most of the computer
and communications cases originated from district court cases in
the Ninth Circuit (19%) and Third Circuit (33%). Computer and
communications cases also account for the largest chunk of
district courts in the Ninth Circuit (33%). As the number of
these cases declined at the Ninth Circuit, the number of cases
originating from the Ninth Circuit overall also declined.

Figure 9: Distribution of Cases by Circuit over Time (District
Court)

253
Harvard Bus. Servs., Why Delaware Corporate Law Matters So Much,
DELAWAREINC.COM (July 24, 2017), https://www.delawareinc.com/blog/why-delawarecorporate-law-matters-so-much/ [https://perma.cc/65AF-DGCD] (identifying the following
reasons for the popularity of such cases: “[v]enture capitalists and angel
investors . . . typically prefer investing in Delaware companies than companies
incorporated in other states”; “[s]tartup costs [in Delaware] . . . are among the lowest in
the world”; “Delaware’s Court of Chancery . . . possesses the most current corporate case
law in the country”; and “[Delawarean] corporations retain tremendous flexibility when
it comes to structuring and running their companies.”).
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Figure 10: Distribution of Cases by Industry over Time (District
Court)
At the district court level, patentees prevailed most often in
the Third Circuit (35%), the Ninth Circuit (22%), and the
Seventh Circuit (28%).254 No other empirical study on the
doctrine of equivalents looked at data across the various circuits,
so there is no data for comparison.

Figure 11: Distribution of Appeals to Federal Circuit

254
This result discounted the single patentee win in the Tenth Circuit out of the
three cases heard there.
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At the Federal Circuit, most cases unsurprisingly originated
from district courts in the Third Circuit (22%) and Ninth Circuit
(19%), and surprisingly few cases originated from the Seventh
Circuit (12%) (Figure 11). This suggests that despite the
relatively large number of cases heard and decided in the district
courts in the Seventh Circuit, litigants there may find settlement
or resolution preferable to continuing to battle on the merits.
Procedural posture was another feature of patent litigation
this Article analyzed. Whether an accused device “infringe[s]
under the doctrine of equivalents is a question of fact.”255 Courts
typically grant summary judgment of noninfringement “[w]here
the evidence is such that no reasonable jury could determine two
elements to be equivalent.”256 Parties submit conflicting expert
reports which usually lead judges to conclude that the issue is
“an intensely factual inquiry” and must be tried to a jury.257 This
Article coded for the eleven categories of posture (see Figure 12
below).258

Figure 12: Procedural Posture over Time

255

Akzo Nobel Coatings, Inc. v. Dow Chem. Co., 811 F.3d 1334, 1342 (Fed. Cir.

2016).
256

Id. (citation omitted).
See Toro Co. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 266 F.3d 1367, 1369–70 (Fed. Cir.
2001) (citation omitted), aff’d, 383 F.3d 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
258
Preliminary injunction; Summary judgment (patentee); Summary judgment
(accused infringer); Jury trial; Bench trial; JMOL (patentee); JMOL (accused
infringer); Summary judgment (Both); Pleading on DOE (P); Declaratory judgment
(AI); Rule 11.
257
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Conventional wisdom holds that “summary judgment is now
the most likely method of disposition for patent cases.”259 To
prevail, patentees had “to provide particularized testimony and
linking argument to show the equivalents.”260
Conversely
“[g]eneralized testimony as to the overall similarity between the
claims and the accused infringer’s product or process will not
suffice.”261 These requirements assure that the fact-finder does
“not, under the guise of applying the doctrine of equivalents,
erase a plethora of meaningful structural and functional
limitations of the claim on which the public is entitled to rely in
avoiding infringement.”262 However, courts will reject motions for
summary judgment when there is conflicting expert testimony on
the application of the “function-way-result” or “insubstantial
differences test.”263
The Supreme Court acknowledged concerns “over
unreviewability due to black-box jury verdicts.”264 As a form of
“procedural improvement[ ],” it encouraged district courts to
grant summary judgment for the defendant where “no reasonable
jury could determine two elements to be equivalent,” or where
“legal limitations on the application of the doctrine of equivalents
are to be determined by the court, either on a pretrial motion for
partial summary judgment or on a motion for judgment as a
matter of law . . .”265 In this way, a trial judge could intercept an
issue before it got to the jury by determining that the “allelements” rule or one of the doctrine’s limits barred its
application.266 Indeed, as one court put it, a court “not only has
the discretion, but is in fact required to grant summary
adjudication in any case where no reasonable fact finder could

259

White, supra note 195, at 786.
AquaTex Indus., Inc. v. Techniche Sols., 479 F.3d 1320, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
261
Tex. Instruments, Inc. v. Cypress Semiconductor Corp., 90 F.3d 1558, 1567
(Fed. Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1228 (1997).
262
Perkin-Elmer Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 822 F.2d 1528, 1532 (Fed.
Cir. 1987).
263
See e.g., Crown Packaging Tech., Inc. v. Rexam Bev. Can Co., 559 F. 3d 1308,
1315 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (conflicting expert evidence regarding function establishes
material issue of fact), rev’d, 635 F.3d 1373 (2011).
264
Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co., 520 U.S. 17, 42 n.8
(1997).
265
Id.
266
PrinterOn Inc. v. BreezyPrint Corp., 93 F. Supp. 3d 658, 691 (S.D. Tex. 2015)
(“Although infringement under the doctrine of equivalents is a fact question, a court
may determine as a matter of law that the ‘all limitations’ rule, the prior art, or
prosecution history estoppel preclude the claim.”).
260
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find equivalence even if equivalence is a factual matter normally
reserved for the jury.”267
The data shows that motions for summary judgment brought
by accused infringers were indeed by far the most dominant
procedural posture (57%) followed distantly by bench trials (12%)
and summary judgement motions brought by both parties (12%).
Accused infringers won 70% of district court cases and 77% of
Federal Circuit cases when they brought summary judgment,
comparable with the Allison-Lemley study (“approximately twothirds”).268 This shows that seeking summary judgment is clearly
a winning strategy for accused infringers.
Summary judgment motions brought by patentees were
uncommon (3%). The Allison-Lemley study provides a clue as to
why. The authors observed that:
Even under the relatively permissive doctrine of equivalents
rules in place before 2000, equivalents claims usually failed,
most often on summary judgment. That became even more true
after 2000, and the Supreme Court’s 2002 decision didn’t
change the trend. In fact, district courts are more likely to
reject doctrine of equivalents claims today than ever before.269

Their data showed that courts applied the doctrine of
equivalents routinely until between the mid-1990s and mid2000s, during which a dramatic shift occurred.270 In 1996, the
Supreme Court held that claim interpretation, or a Markman
hearing, as it would be called, was an issue for the judge, not the
jury.271 Claim construction is relatively easier to use and reduces
the unpredictability of jury trials by shifting the determination to
judges. Moreover, once judges rule on claim construction, they
want to resolve the entire dispute since judges constructing
claims know the accused products’ structures.272 This allows
them to settle on a broader construction to avoid having the jury
contend with the doctrine.273
267

Dahl v. Swift Distributions, Inc., 757 F. Supp. 2d 976, 982 (C.D. Cal. 2010).
Allison & Lemley, supra note 4, at 971, app. at 981 tbl.2.
269
Id. at 958.
270
Id.; Petherbridge, supra note 1, at 1378–79; Lee Petherbridge, The Claim
Construction Effect, 15 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 215, 233 (2008).
271
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 391 (1996); see also
Schwartz, supra note 4, at 1179 (“[T]he displacement of the doctrine of equivalents,
which led to its decreasing importance, occurred after Markman I, well before any
direct assaults on the doctrine in these cases.”).
272
Allison & Lemley, supra note 4, at 958.
273
Schwartz, supra note 4, at 1181 (“[C]ourts may have found these doctrines to
be substitutes for each other. . . . [C]laim construction has arguably expanded to
268

118

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 95:65

Patentees won 40% of cases at the district court and won
only one case in two appeals heard by the Federal Circuit
involving a patentee-initiated summary judgment. The AllisonLemley study reported that patentees won 55.6% of cases when
they filed.274 Interestingly, two Rule 11 cases involved the
doctrine of equivalents; these arose in the context of clients
accusing their attorneys of malpractice.275
CONCLUSION
The doctrine of equivalents enables patentees to ensnare
defendants’ inventions when they are similar, but only if those
differences are insubstantial.
In every case, judges must
straddle a difficult balance between two competing policy goals.
The first is fairness to patentees by giving them the full scope of
their patent claims. The second is predictability to the public by
giving them full notice of what patentees have claimed.
By coding the reported data and reasoning in each case, this
Article reveals that the doctrine of equivalents experienced a
recent revitalization—unnoticed and unproven until now.
Among the multitude of results, some key findings include the
rise and fall of industries and tests applied; the dominance of
specific litigation venues and postures as well as patentee and
alleged infringer win rates; the dynamics at the Federal Circuit;
which judges dominate as well as affirmance and reversal rates;
and, finally, the tests and limits applied. These findings are
informative to practitioners and academics alike. This Article
provides an empirical basis for judges, scholars, policymakers,
and patent attorneys to better understand the doctrine’s nature
in order to contextualize its evolution and chart its future.
Looking ahead, future studies on the doctrine of equivalents
could look at a host of subjects informed by this Article’s dataset
and findings. Some include: is the doctrine of equivalents
encompass the doctrine of equivalents.”); Id. (“[J]udges quickly decided the doctrine
of equivalents under the guise of summary judgment to keep the case from the
jury.”); Id. at 1182 (“Judges who held separate hearings may have been more likely
to learn the technology and have a greater desire to dispose of the case in its entirety
after claim construction.”); Allison & Lemley, supra note 4, at 958 (“That dataset
bears out our hypothesis. The doctrine of equivalents was alive and well before
Markman but has been in decline ever since.”).
274
Allison & Lemley, supra note 4, at 984.
275
Touchcom, Inc. v. Bereskin & Parr, 790 F. Supp. 2d 435, 439 (E.D. Va. 2011);
Vehicle Operation Techs. LLC v. Am. Honda Motor Co. Inc., 67 F. Supp. 3d 637, 641
(D. Del. 2014).
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uncertain and if so, how courts mitigate that uncertainty?; does
the Priest-Klein hypothesis influence doctrine of equivalents
cases more than other types of cases and if so, why?; more
granular studies breaking down to the dataset further to look at
individual district courts; the impact of equity on case outcomes;
the impact of pioneer inventions; and how mean-plus-function
claims intersect with the doctrine of equivalents. More broadly,
just as the Allison-Lemley study helped provide an important
launchpad for this Article, this Article will inform other studies
on patent, trademark, and copyright law looking at similar
infringement factors. In this sense, all articles that have gone
before are notes for other papers and thinking drafts. And that is
as it should be.

